

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

GO WORLD

Winter 1989-90 NO.58



THE ISHI PRESS

GO POST CARDS

The Ishi Press has just published two sets of post cards featuring wood block prints with go as the main theme. Each set contains eight cards, with a different print depicted on each card, for a total of 16 different prints. Some of the prints in these sets have appeared on Go World covers (GW13, GW23, GW24, GW31, & GW38), and a variety of famous artists (Harunobu, Kuniyoshi, Toyokuni, Hiroshige, etc.) are represented. These post cards are the ideal medium for sending messages to your friends and arousing their curiosity about the world's most fascinating game.

Below are four of the prints included in these two sets.



Utagawa Kuniyoshi (1798–1861)
Sato Tadanobu crushing two foes with a go board while wrestling with a third (1830)



Toyokuni III (1786–1867)
Chinese generals playing go (1847)



Utagawa Kuniyoshi (1798–1861)
A 14th-century general drawing inspiration from the go board (1850)



Toyokuni III (1786–1867)
Two courtesans with a go board in the background (1861)

In North America, order from:

Ishi Press International
1400 N. Shoreline Blvd., Building A7
Mountain View, California
USA 94043
Price: \$6.00 per set plus \$1.00 s/h per order.

All other countries order from:


The Ishi Press, Inc.
CPO Box 2126
Tokyo, Japan
Price: ¥1,200 per set (including shipping and handling)

Feature Articles in This Issue

Modern Master: Kobayashi Koichi

Kobayashi Koichi's stock rose considerably last year when he defended his Kisei, Meijin, and Gosei titles and also vanquished the Chinese Meijin in an international playoff. He has established himself as the master player of contemporary go. His style is incisive and pragmatic, his reading is deep and far-reaching, his self-confidence is overwhelming. After four years at the top of Japanese go, he has come into his own and is carving an honoured place in the annals of modern go.

In this issue, we take an in-depth look at Kobayashi's performance in two title matches, the 1988 and 1989 Meijin title matches, in an attempt to throw some light on the reasons for his outstanding success.



All About the Monkey Jump

Our featured instructional article this issue is an analysis of an endgame technique that causes a lot of confusion to kyu players. In fact, you can even see dan-level players mishandle it. Not any longer — by the time you've read and absorbed our comprehensive treatment of it, you should be able to handle the main variations of this endgame tesuji with confidence. To make sure you understand it, we present five problems in the following article.

The first time a beginner sees the monkey jump played against him, it's often quite a shock. The first aim of our article, naturally, is simply to show you how to halt this incursion before your whole side is ripped to shreds. On top of that, however, we aim to show you how to block the monkey jump in the most profitable way.

Also in this issue

Tibetan Go

For a change of pace, we have a well-researched article on a fascinating but neglected aspect of go history, the history of go in Tibet. John Fairbairn throws new light on the development of go in the Orient. See *Go on the Roof of the World*, starting on page 10.

The cover

One of two scenes from *The Tale of Genji* used in the first postage stamps in Japan featuring go. As far as we know, the only other stamp featuring go was issued by Taiwan some years ago. A brief article giving the background to the Japanese stamps may be found on page 65.

Reproduced by permission of the Tokugawa Reimeikai.

CONTENTS

Go World News	3
Go on the Roof of the World	10
One-Move Problem	15
Kobayashi Koichi: Modern Master	16
The 13th Meijin Title (1988): Kobayashi Overcomes the Kato Jinx	17
Game One: Kato the Killer	18
Game Two: A Masterpiece Ruined by One Move	24
Game Three: Kobayashi's Exquisite Move	27
Game Four: Outreading Kato	31
Game Five: Meijin Again	36
The 14th Meijin Title (1989): Kobayashi Outboxes Awaji	39
Game One: Never Say Die	41
Game Two: No Quarter	46
Good Style and Correct Shape	51
Eight Tesuji Problems	51
36 Tesuji Patterns	52
36 Life and Death Patterns	52
How to Stop the Monkey Jump	58
Stopping the Monkey Jump	61
The Tale of Genji: Japan's First Go Stamp	65
1989 in Statistics	66
Go Topics, Go Trivia	67

Go World is published by The Ishi Press, Inc.
 Address subscriptions to: The Ishi Press, Inc.
 CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan
 Editor: John Power

Yearly subscription rate: ¥5,000 (4 issues)
 Price per single issue: ¥1,250
 Airmail rate: ¥1,800 per issue; ¥7,200 a year
 Prices for back issues 1, 7-57: ¥1,250@

U.S. and Canadian subscribers should order from:
ISHI PRESS INTERNATIONAL
 1400 North Shoreline Blvd., Building A7
 Mountain View, California 94043

Go World is published quarterly and is distributed in the U.S. for \$15.00 per year by Ishi Press International, 1400 Shoreline Blvd., Building A7, Mountain View, CA 94043. Second-class postage paid at Mountain View, California.
 POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Go World, 1400 North Shoreline Blvd., Building A7, Mountain View, CA 94043.

Note: Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

© Copyright 1989 in Japan by The Ishi Press, Inc. ISSN 0286-0376

All rights reserved according to international law. This magazine or any parts thereof may not be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher.

Go World News

International News

Takemiya Wins Showdown Between World Champions

With two world champions, one in the Ing Cup and one in the Fujitsu Cup, the next logical step was to stage a showdown between them. Two Japanese companies stepped in and sponsored a best-of-three match between Takemiya Masaki of Japan, the Fujitsu Champion, and Cho Hun-hyun of Korea, the Ing Champion. This match was not a contest to decide a unified world champion, unfortunately, but the winner could still claim to be the world's number one.

The match was played in Seoul and victory went to Takemiya, who shocked Korean go fans by defeating their favourite two straight. Takemiya hasn't been happy with his results in Japanese tournaments recently (he lost the Honinbo title to Cho last year and is in danger of losing his place in the Honinbo league), but once again he rose to the occasion in the international arena. Both of the games, played on 20 and 22 March, were marked by fierce fighting and in both he forced Cho Hun-hyun to

resign. His reward was a prize of 15 million yen (just under \$100,000), which matches the Fujitsu prize. We hope to present these games in a later issue.

Takemiya now has an excellent record against Cho. He beat him in the semifinal of the 2nd Fujitsu Cup and also in a TV game, imposingly billed as the Japan-Korea Summit Go Showdown and played in Seoul a couple of weeks before the latest match.

China Poised to Win in 5th Super Go

Japan has suffered setback after setback in the 5th Japan-China Super Go series, and now only one player remains to stave off its fourth defeat.

After a long break, following the 'Tiananmen incident', as the go press refers to it, of June 4 last year, the series was finally resumed in November when two Japanese players visited Hangzhou City. On 4 November Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan of Japan lost to Zhang Wendong 7-dan, the 1988 WAGC champion, who subsequently turned professional. Zhang won by 2 1/2 points, then two days later beat Hane 9-dan, the hero of Japan's triumph in the 4th series, by half a point (this game is given in



Sakata (left) loses to Qian

the 1990 Ranka Yearbook).

The next two games were played in Singapore in December, the first time that the venue has been a third country. Zhang extended his record to three in a row by defeating Ohira Shuzo 9-dan on 23 December (Ohira resigned) before losing to Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan on 25 December (Zhang resigned). Zhang's three wins had put his country ahead 4-2: he is yet another Chinese WAGC champion to achieve success as a pro.

The next two games were played in China, and the visit was as much of a disaster for the Japanese as the previous one. This time the star for China was Yu Bin 8-dan, who has improved out of sight since he took 2nd place in the 9th WAGC, played in Beijing in 1987. Yu has developed into one of the top players in China, and he showed his class by defeating Yamashiro by 2 1/2 points on 23 February and Ishida Yoshio on the 25th (Ishida resigned).

Down 2-6, Japan was now in real trouble and the player it looked to as its saviour was one of the greats of go history, Sakata Eio. Sakata recently celebrated his 70th birthday (on 15 February) — he has been a professional player since 1935 — but he has been enjoying great form recently, leading throughout the current Honinbo league. Sakata started well, defeating Yu Bin, 48 years his junior, by 2 1/2 points on 13 March, but then he was outplayed by Qian Yuping 9-dan (age 23), who beat him by 4 1/2 points on 16 March.

Japan's last hope is the team captain, Takemiya Masaki 9-dan, but his record in the Super Go series is not encouraging. So far he hasn't won a game, losing to Nie in the 2nd series in 1986 and to Ma in the 3rd in 1987. However, these results are in contrast to his outstanding record against Chinese players in other international tournaments: he has beaten Nie twice in the annual Japan-China matches and has beaten four Chinese players in the two Fujitsu Cups, with only an upset loss to Jiang in the Ing Cup to counterbalance them.

The remaining players Takemiya will have to overcome, if he can first dispose of Qian, are Jiang Zhujiu, Liu, Ma, and Nie.

Kobayashi Wins 2nd Japan-China Meijin Match

The 2nd Japan-China Meijin Match is the fourth of these playoffs between holders of titles with the same names in China and Japan and it has ended with the same result as the

previous three: a 2-0 victory by Japan. This time Kobayashi Meijin of Japan was pitted against Ma Xiaochun Mingren, who had taken the Chinese title from Liu Xiaoguang with three straight wins. Ma was unable to improve on Liu's performance in the 1988 match.

The games were played in Beijing on 14 and 16 December 1989. Kobayashi won the first by 2 1/2 points and forced Ma to resign in the second. After the match someone on the host side mentioned to the Japanese that in China Kobayashi is referred to as 'the Kobayashi devil'. Kobayashi protested, but he didn't look too displeased. The reason for the nickname is that the Chinese players consider Kobayashi the hardest Japanese player to beat. He has now played 14 games against Chinese players in China and has not lost one of them (including two wins over Nie). Just to show he's human, in the eight games he's played in Japan against Chinese players, he's lost two (both to Nie, whom he's also beaten once in Japan, to give him a plus record against him), but his overall record is still an impressive 20-2.



News from Japan

Kobayashi Defends Kisei

Kobayashi Koichi has earned the title of Honorary Kisei by winning the Kisei title for the fifth year in a row. This year the challenger was Otake Hideo, who defeated Cho Chikun 2-0 in the playoff held at the end of last year, but Otake was not able to make much impression on the title-holder. He improved on his previous Kisei challenge, which he lost 0-4 to

Fujisawa Shuko in 1981, by winning the second game of the title match, but his luck went no further. The turning point of the series was the fourth game, which featured extremely difficult large-scale fighting. Otake took the lead, but then let the win slip away from him. Instead of evening the series with two wins each, he fell behind 1-3 and perhaps this caused him to lose heart.

Ironically, Otake has now helped to create two Honorary Kiseis, for 1981 was the year Shuko won the title for the 5th time. Another ironic note: when Kobayashi won the Kisei title from Cho, Otake predicted that Kobayashi would last two years at the top. Kobayashi has now defeated most of his main rivals (the main player he has yet to be matched with is Rin), so it is hard to see who is going to stop him from breaking Shuko's record of six Kisei titles. An interesting pattern has emerged in Kobayashi's title matches. This was the sixth best-of-seven in a row that he has won 4-1. He drops one game, giving the challenger false hope (in three cases it was the first game), but then he clamps down. As in his other recent title defences, his play was calm and self-confident and he showed few chinks in his armour.

Results:

Game 1 (played in Dusseldorf on 18, 19 Jan.). Kobayashi (B) won by 3 1/2 points.

Game 2 (31 Jan., 1 Feb.). Otake (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (7, 8 Feb.). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (21, 22 Feb.). Kobayashi (W) won by resig.

Game 5 (28 Feb., 1 March). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Kato Sets New Record in Defending Oza

Kato Masao may be in a slump, but his challengers in the Oza title have yet to see evidence of it. Kato set a new record last year by becoming the first player to win the one title ten times. He has also won the Oza for eight years in a row, so his next target is bettering Takagawa's record of nine successive terms in the Honinbo title.

The challenger, Hane Yasumasa 9-dan, made a good start by winning the first game, but Kato shut him out in the next three.

The results:

Game 1 (13 Oct.). Hane (B) won by 1/2 point.

Game 2 (25 Oct.). Kato (B) won by 2 1/2 points.

Game 3 (15 Nov.). Kato (W) won by resig.

Game 4 (26 Nov.). Kato (B) won by 7 1/2 points.



Hane's crowbar fails to dislodge Kato, who has the Oza (= throne) title nailed down. (Cartoon by Ayuzawa Makoto)

Rin Takes Tengen Title from Cho

In a dramatic fightback, Rin recovered from a 1-2 start to win the fourth and 5th games and take the 15th Tengen title from Cho Chikun. This victory gave Rin his first title for four years and his first Tengen title. Cho is now down to two titles, the Honinbo and the Judan.

The results:

Game 1 (10 Nov.). Cho (W) won by resig.

Game 2 (24 Nov.). Rin (W) won by resig.

Game 3 (8 Dec.). Cho (W) won by resig.

Game 4 (15 Dec.). Rin (W) won by resig.

Game 5 (22 Dec.). Rin (B) won by resig.

Takemiya Wins 1st Game of Judan Title Match

Takemiya is making one of his rare attempts to take another title besides the Honinbo. He is challenging Cho Chikun for the 28th Judan title and has made a good start by winning the first game, played on 8 March. Takemiya previously challenged for the Judan title in 1986 but lost 0-3 to Kobayashi. Takemiya has 'specialized' in the Honinbo and has never won any of the six other open titles.

To become the challenger, Takemiya defeated Kobayashi Koichi in the final of the losers' section, then Yamashiro Hiroshi in the playoff between the losers' and the winners'

45th Honinbo League (as of 31 March 1990) Title-holder: Cho Chikun

Rank	Player	T	O	KK	K	F	S	R	Y	Score
1	Takemiya	—	0		1	1	0	0	1	3 - 3
2	Otake	1	—	1	0		0	1	1	4 - 2
3	Kobayashi K.		0	—	1	1	1	1	0	4 - 2
4	Kataoka	0	1	0	—	1	0	0		2 - 4
5	Fujisawa S.	0		0	0	—	0	0	0	0 - 6
5	Sakata	1	1	0	1	1	—		1	5 - 1
5	Rin Kaiho	1	0	0	1	1		—	0	3 - 3
5	Yoda	0	0	1		1	0	1	—	3 - 3

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

sections.

Late news. The second game, played on 28 March, was also won by Takemiya.

Sakata Leads Honinbo League

The magnificent Sakata, in top form as he enters his 70s, has led all the way in the current Honinbo league and has to overcome only one more obstacle, his final-round game with Rin, to become the oldest player ever to challenge for a title. However, Rin has always been a tough opponent for Sakata, and if he stumbles there is a possibility of an ironic denouement. If Otake and Kobayashi both win their final-round games, they will qualify for the playoff to decide the challenger while Sakata will miss out. To simplify the problem of multiple ties, which sometimes occur in the

Honinbo league, the rule is that the two higher-ranked players qualify for the playoff. If only one of the two wins, of course, he meets Sakata in the playoff — if Sakata loses.

The previous Honinbo, Takemiya, is having a tough time and has to win his final game to be sure of avoiding demotion.

Yoda and Cho Lead Meijin League

Yoda Norimoto 7-dan and Cho Chikun have made the best start in the 15th Meijin league, but they have a lead only by virtue of having played one more round than some of the other players. It's not too early to note, unfortunately, that Kato and Shuko seem headed for disaster. The length of the slump into which Kato has fallen is one of the great mysteries of Japanese go.

15th Meijin League (as of 31 March 1990) Title-holder: Kobayashi Koichi

Rank	Player	A	R	T	C	H	K	O	F	Y	Score
1	Awaji	—		1			1		0	0	2 - 2
2	Rin		—	0	1			0			1 - 2
3	Takemiya	0	1	—				1			2 - 1
4	Cho Chikun		0		—		1		1	1	3 - 1
5	Honda					—	1	0	1	0	2 - 2
6	Kato	0			0	0	—				0 - 3
7	Otake		1	0		1		—			2 - 1
7	Fujisawa S.	1			0	0			—	0	1 - 3
7	Yoda	1			0	1			1	—	3 - 1

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

The 24-year-old Yoda attracted some attention when he held the sole lead after two rounds, but then he ran into Cho.

Women's Tournaments

Kusunoki Defends Women's Honinbo

The 8th Women's Honinbo was the first Japanese title match ever to feature the same pairing four years in a row. In 1986 Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan took this title from Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan and since losing it back to her in 1987 she has challenged each year. This time she was once again unsuccessful, losing the match 0-2 and giving Kusunoki her fifth Women's Honinbo title. The games were played on 9 and 24 November.

New Star Aoki Wins 2nd Women's Meijin

The Women's Meijin is a unique tournament in two ways: it's the only Japanese professional tournament that uses the Swiss system (a four-round tournament with eight players) and the only one in which amateurs are allowed to participate. So far no amateur woman player has won her way to the final group of eight players, but at least there's one tournament that's open.

Last year the new star Miyazaki Shimako (born in October 1968) won the inaugural tournament; this year yet another new star has emerged, Aoki Kikuyo, who is just a little older (she was born in May 1968). Aoki was the only player to win all four of her games. She beat Kusunoki Teruko, Women's Honinbo, in the first round, Kobayashi Chizu, Women's Kakusei, in the second, Sugiuchi Kazuko 8-dan in the third, and Miyazaki in the fourth, so she probably had a tougher card than anyone else. It will be interesting to see how far Aoki develops.

Rin Wins His First NEC Cup

Rin Kaiho 9-dan defeated his fellow Taiwanese player O Rissei in the final of the 9th NEC Cup, played on 10 March. In the past, we've mistakenly grouped this title with the TV titles in our news reports, but the games are not televised. Rather they are played before audiences at various venues throughout Japan. Fourteen players, made up of the previous winner and the top 13 players in the previous year's prize money list, compete for the first prize of ¥8,000,000 in a knock-out tournament. This year there was a capacity

audience of 1,500 for the final. To reach the final, Rin beat Ohira, Kobayashi Koichi, and Cho, while O beat Awaji, Otake, and Takemiya.

The final of the 5th Rising Stars, a parallel tournament for young players, was held on the same day. Komatsu Hideki 7-dan defeated Michael Redmond 6-dan.

TV Titles

Ishida Wins 37th NHK Cup

In the final of the 37th NHK Cup, played on 12 February, Ishida Yoshio 9-dan defeated Otake Hideo 9-dan to win his second NHK Cup. Ishida took his revenge on Otake for his loss to him in the final of the 1971 Cup, not to mention his more recent loss in the final of last year's IBM Cup. Incidentally, Fujisawa Shuko reached the semifinal (he lost to Otake), about the only success he has enjoyed recently. Ishida beat Rin in the other semifinal.

First place is worth ¥3,000,000.

Kataoka Wins 12th Kakusei Cup

After a quiet decade since winning the Tengen title in 1982 and 1983, Kataoka Satoshi has emerged from hibernation to win the Kakusei Cup, the richest of the TV lightning go titles. This is Kataoka's first win in a TV title. In the final, played on 12 February, he defeated O Rissei. First prize is ¥4,500,000.

News from Korea

Cho Hun-hyun Becomes Korea's First Kisung

The newly established Kisung (= Japanese Kisei) title was won by Cho Hun-hyun, who thus becomes Korea's first 'go saint'. Readers of this magazine won't be surprised at this result, but actually Cho initially had a hard time of it. His opponent in the best-of-seven title match (since this was the first term, a league was held, with the top two qualifying for the final) was Yoo Chang-hyeok 3-dan, who, despite his lowly rank, has recently been Cho's toughest opponent (he upset Takemiya in last year's IBM Cup). Yoo took an early lead, winning the first and third games. This prompted speculation in the newspapers that Cho, the 1st Ing World Champion, was weak in domestic tournaments, so Cho set the record straight by winning the next three games and taking the title. The first prize is

27,000,000 won. Incidentally, this was Cho's 108th title, an indication of how he dominates Korean go.

Other Korean Titles

Cho is also engaged in three other title matches. In the 29th Chaigowi (top position) title, he is matched, for the 4th time in the last year or so, against his fourteen-year-old disciple Lee Changho, who was promoted to 4-dan in December 1989. The best-of-five match is tied 2-2. In the 25th Paewang title match, Cho fended off Wu 3-dan with three straight wins, giving him this title 13 years in a row. In the Kiwang title match, Cho is leading the title-holder, Suh Bongsoo 9-dan, 2-1. In the Daewang title he has a 2-0 lead over the title-holder, Yoo 3-dan.

Best Results for 1989

Cho's main rivals recently have been low-ranked players. He easily took first place in the 5- to 9-dan section with 52 wins to 17 losses, a winning percentage of 77.5. In the bottom section, Yoo scored the best winning percentage, while Lee scored the most wins (84 out of an extraordinary 111 games played).

News from China

Nie Defends New Physical Education Cup

Nie Weiping rebuffed the challenge of Yu Bin with three straight games. The results:

Game 1 (9 Nov. 1989). Nie (B) won by resig.

Game 2 (12 Nov.). Nie (W) won by 2 1/2 points.

Game 3 (12 Dec.). Nie (B) won by resig.

Nie Wins Ten Strongest Players Title

This title is similar to the Pro Best Ten title in Japan, which was discontinued by the Asahi when it took over the Meijin title from the Yomiuri. Amateur fans vote to choose the ten most popular players, who then split up into two groups, each of which stages an all-play-all league. The winners then meet in a playoff.

The order of popularity was: Nie, Ma, Liu, Qian, Jiang, Yu Bin, Tsao, Rui Naiwei, Chen Xinlin, Wang Qun.

As expected, Nie and Ma won their respective leagues, and the playoff, held in December 1989, was won by Nie. However, 3rd place was a surprise, for it was taken by Rui Naiwei, the world's only woman 9-dan. Our announcement of her retirement in GW56 (page

Continued on Page 67

WORKSHOPS IN THE PRACTICAL CREATIVE AND HEALING ARTS

GO WORKSHOP AT HOLLYHOCK



"The focus of the workshop will be on improving your strategic decisions and broadening your whole board vision. Improving your tactics and local fighting will also be taught."


James Kerwin

A five-day workshop, July 9-14, at Hollyhock with James Kerwin, a professional shodan since 1978. Kerwin, a disciple of Iwamoto Kaoru, 9-dan, became the first

Westerner to enter the record books of professional tournament go when he won the 1-dan section of the 4th Kisei tournament in 1978. The workshop will be followed by dan-level and kyu-level tournaments.

Hollyhock is located on Cortes Island, 100 miles north of Vancouver, Canada in a beautiful West Coast beach setting. Tuition, plus full room and board \$585 (Canadian Dollars). Spouses and children welcome.

Register by sending a \$100 deposit or write for our free brochure.



Write for a free brochure: Hollyhock, Box 127 Manson's Landing, B.C. V0P 1K0, or phone (604) 935-6465.

Make It Easier to Master Go!

One of the biggest reasons you read *Go World* is to study professional games, a sure way to improve your playing strength. Here's a way to make it easier to study those games—and **double** the number of games you get with each issue of *Go World*!

Your computer offers a particularly effective way to present a game with its commentary. No longer do you have to fill in board positions between diagrams in your imagination. An exact diagram appears for each board position, including annotations. The computer displays comments and variations at just the right point during play. True, you could follow all of these lines on a physical Go board, but a single misplaced stone can spoil the whole analysis, and backing up from variations can be cumbersome and tedious. Your computer is quicker and surer. Here is a great new tool to improve your play and improve your appreciation of the artistry of the best Go players in the world!

Subscribe to *Go World on Disk* and get all of the games from each issue pre-recorded on floppy. Each quarter you will receive a data disk that contains each of the games in *Go World*, complete with commentary. Also on the disk you will find a number of other Japanese, Korean, and Chinese professional games, plus significant amateur games. We have never had room to include these other games in the printed edition of *Go World*, but now you can get them on disk.

To read *Go World on Disk* you'll need *GoScribe*—a game recording and playback program that allows you to record, comment, edit, and annotate your Go games. The newly released *GoScribe 2.0* includes an excellent, menu-driven, graphic interface, good commentary editing capabilities, an automatic what's-the-next-move problem capability, support of play variations, laser printer support, and more. If you just want to playback pre-recorded games, *GoView* is a special, less expensive version without recording capabilities.

As a special offer to new subscribers to *Go World on Disk*, you can save \$20 on the purchase of *GoScribe* or *GoView*! *GoScribe* is only available in IBM format, but Macintosh users can get full playback and many of the recording capabilities with our *Contender* Go-playing program. And, you can get \$20 off on its purchase when you subscribe. (Previous owners of *Contender* will need to upgrade to the March release—just send in your old program disk with your subscription for a FREE upgrade.)

Send your order in today so you can be sure to receive the inaugural issue of *Go World on Disk*. Please specify whether you want IBM, 5.25" or 3.5" disk, or Macintosh format. A year's subscription to *Go World on Disk* is just \$40 on 5.25" floppy or \$46 on 3.5" (either IBM or Macintosh). Subscribers outside North America should add \$10 for surface mail or \$20 for airmail. *GoScribe* is \$59.95, *GoView* \$20, and *Contender* \$49.95. Don't forget to knock \$20 off these prices for subscribing to *Go World on Disk*! Shipping is \$3 in North America, \$4 overseas surface or \$7 overseas airmail. California residents please add 7.25% sales tax for the program only. Please send your remittance in U.S. dollars, check drawn on a U.S. bank. We are happy to accept VISA or Mastercard orders by mail, phone, or FAX. International Postal Money Orders are also acceptable. Send to: Ishi Press International, 1400 N. Shoreline Blvd, Bldg A7, Mt. View, CA 94043 USA, Tel: (415) 964-7294, FAX: (415) 964-7509

Go on the Roof of the World

John Fairbairn

In November 1958 the Japanese go magazine *Kido* announced the discovery of go in Sikkim. Shortly afterwards, in March 1959, the Crown Prince of Sikkim went to Japan to attend a Buddhist conference. The Japanese Go Association took the opportunity to invite him to their headquarters, the Nihon Ki-in, and there he agreed to play a game under the rules of his kingdom — on a traditional 17x17 board — with the 6-dan professional Iyomoto Momoichi.

It turned out that the Sikkimese rules were the same as Tibetan rules, for the Crown Prince had in fact learnt the game from his wife, a daughter of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual ruler of Tibet. The discovery of this version of go, of great interest in itself, was also regarded as important because it seemed likely to shed new light on how go used to be played in ancient China.

From ancient Chinese sources we already know that there were differences between the old Chinese rules and the new (for example, in the way the final count was done), and it is also generally accepted that various methods of playing must once have co-existed in different parts of China. The picture is reasonably clear over the past millenium because we have game scores to show us how most of the different rules applied. But beyond that is a haze.




Figure 1

Yet the Tibetan rules, and perhaps the old Korean rules too, may, if they really are a relic of the past, take us back even nearer the time around 2600 BC when a minister of the Yellow Emperor of China was alleged to sprout insect's wings and to fly up to the top of Mount Shunan to play go!

Information on Tibetan go, however, is extremely sparse. Nevertheless, I will try here to offer some signposts to what is available.

First, the game between the Crown Prince¹ and Iyomoto, played on 2 April 1959. For reasons of etiquette only a few moves were played; they are given in Figure 1.

White plays first, but the game starts with six white and six black stones already in position on the third line (Figure 2). Star points are marked on the board underneath each of these stones.




Figure 2

This feature of fixed starting stones for both sides is also seen in ancient Korean go, but on the fourth line of a 19x19 board (Figure 3 — the letters mark the points on which handicap stones were placed)². The old Chinese habit of starting a game with two white and two black stones on the four corner star-points may be a remnant of this.

The question of the transition (if any) from 17x17 to 19x19 boards is also an important one in this connection, but I shall limit myself to a

footnote here³.

The Sikkimese board was made of cloth and the stones were of the type once usual in China — a sort of flat cone. No similar boards have been found in China except for the 17x17 stone boards found in Han tombs (I think about four have been found so far)⁴ and therefore dated to the first two centuries AD. No records of games played on a 17x17 board exist except the one shown here.






Figure 3

Although not illustrated by this game, the method of counting at the end was said to be the same as in modern China (that is, you count your own territory plus your own stones). But a major difference was that positions like snapbacks and nakades (big eyes) are treated rather like kos: you are not allowed to play back on any point vacated by captured stones until at least one move has elapsed — which makes killing groups none too easy.

For instance, after White 1 in Diagram 1 or Diagram 2, Black could not immediately play on any of the triangled points.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

I suspect there should be other differences, in the case of sekis, for example, but no other rules have been given as far as I know.

The next major development was a booklet called *Data on the History of Physical Education* published by the Beijing Physical Education Council around 1980 which contained an article entitled *Old Tibetan Go*. This was first brought to wide attention by Yasunaga Hajime in the Japanese *Go Magazine* in June 1983, although the original research was due to the Chinese player Cheng Xiaoliu.

Cheng's view is that in the area now encompassed by Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan go first appeared around 700 AD. That was when the first regular cultural links between the Tibetan peoples and the Han Chinese were established.

Go in Tibet is called *mig mang*, which means literally 'many eyes'. This does not refer, however, to eyes as in go, but to the points on a board, and the phrase really means no more than *game board*. As such it is applied to several games, all of which use black and white pieces. Cheng mentions also the 'Crown Prince and the Servants', 'Heaven and Hell' and 'Alignment'.⁵ Games of these types are common throughout Asia and are too well documented to be worth discussing here (but Cheng is surely wrong in implying that they were invented well after go in the 13th century⁶).

Cheng suggests that go has been unchanged throughout the centuries in Tibet. Perhaps the oldest known board there is also a 17x17 board, carved into rock in Changdu, Qinghai Province, which is reputed to be the site of a game played by the legendary king Gesar (hero of the world's longest epic poem) over 1,000 years ago, which Cheng describes as still revered by local shepherd folk. They believe that by walking round the stone several times they will acquire wisdom. This may be no more than a further example of the superstitions surrounding strange-shaped rocks, go (or chess) and divinities common all over China.

Go has never been formalised as a competitive activity in Tibet in the sense of matches, tournaments or championships. Indeed, games would frequently involve more than two players: four or even six, in teams of two, each player taking turns to play for his side but freely consulting with his partners.

The game would appear to be rather un-

common, however (we shall see an explanation for this below). Jen Nai-ch'iang, describing go in Tibet as the 'large encircling game' says this (in German):

It is very difficult and poses great demands, so that only very few play it. Each of the two players has 151 stones, one side black the other white. These include six large stones which never move and remain on the same spot. All the other stones can be moved. The whole method and rules of play are very similar to the large encircling game [daweiqi] of China. It is said to be played only in Lhasa . . .

This article is also the source of a reference by Hummel and Brewster⁸, but they add a photograph of a game in progress inside a tent in Lhasa (about 1961?) which indicates that the fixed starting stones are indeed larger than the rest. It is also apparent that board is probably larger than we are used to, and most of the stones are quite small so that adjacent stones do not appear to be connected. It is difficult to see the position clearly, but I have attempted to reconstruct it in Figure 4. If this is a typical game, the standard of play is very low (which Iyomoto thought of the Crown Prince's play, too). Since White has 27 pieces to Black's 26, we can usefully infer, however, that White played first.




Figure 4

Cheng describes a go custom in one of the old kingdoms of Tibet known as the 'tongue fight'. As each player plays a stone, he must make responses in a predetermined format designed to show how quick-witted he is. Speed is of the essence. For example, if player

A plays the first stone he may start the repartee with, 'This is a rabbit.' B might respond, as he plays his stone, with: 'My stone is a fox.' A continues: 'This is a panther;' B: 'This is a tiger,' and so on. Another example is, A: 'My stone is a sparrow;' B: 'My stone is a nightingale,' and so on through a list of birds. I imagine these lose something in translation — perhaps the lines have to rhyme or start with the same letter in Tibetan — but it is hardly a measure of go skill.

A similar custom of linking riddles is mentioned by Jen, though not with reference to go. If one player cannot answer a riddle he pays a forfeit by saying a *mani* (that is, he recites the Lamaist prayer 'Om! Mani Padme. Hum!')⁹.

Cheng says that the game was really only popular among the aristocracy. All the Tibetan kings have enjoyed playing, and there are many stories to this effect in folk tales. He mentions one about a king who was wise and strong, and exceedingly good at go. But he was also extremely proficient with his tongue. As he played go, therefore, he would also discuss great matters of state with his senior ministers in the form of a tongue fight.

He had a certain advantage in that he kept black-beaked, red-feathered birds that could mimic speech. He allowed them to fly around and eavesdrop, and listened to their chirruping when they returned. In this way he discovered that his queen was planning to be disloyal to him.

The king at once called for his queen to play go with him, and in the course of their tongue fight he used extremely clever words that implied a rebuke for the queen should she ever be disloyal. The queen was ashamed and blushed. Halfway through the game she complained of feeling poorly and hurriedly withdrew to her quarters.

Thereupon the king carefully analysed the words she had uttered during the tongue fight. Convinced of her treachery, he repeated the ploy the next day, again with the help of his birds, and eventually trapped the queen into compromising herself. She then prostrated herself, begged forgiveness and revealed all the details of the secret plot. The king put all her accomplices to death and reduced her to the rank of commoner.

There is another story that after the Gtsang dynasty had taken over Tibet for the first time in the 17th century and tried to suppress Bud-

dhism, the 5th Dalai Lama made a secret pact in 1641 with the Mongol general Gu-shri Khan, leader of the Khoshut tribe, as a result of which Gu-shri threw out the Gtsang. But the Mongols decided to stay in Tibet under Gu-shri's successor, Lha-bzang Khan, with Lha-bzang as king and the Dalai Lama as ruler. The arrangement worked, and ushered in a period of peace, but when the Lama died in 1679, his trusted retainer Sangs-rgyas rgya-mtsho hid the fact while he sought the next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama (the dead one's soul was supposed to transmigrate into the body of a child) and had himself appointed a minister-regent in the Lama's name. Relations with Lha-bzang became strained, but with both men surrounded by strong military forces they eventually decided to play a match of three games of go, under public gaze, for hegemony of Tibet. Lha-bzang Khan won and eventually killed Sangs-rgyas rgya-mtsho in 1705.¹⁰

To the highly superstitious Tibetans go then became unlucky, and the game declined among the populace, although it remained popular with the aristocracy. It was their custom, during the festival of *Playing in the Garden* on the 15th day of the 4th month of the Tibetan calendar,¹¹ to invite their friends to their flower gardens, there to dine, sing, dance and play games — with go regarded as the most important.

As to the fact that go was known to the Mongols, it is interesting to compare the description of their version of the game given by Assia Popova.¹² She describes more or less the same game as in Tibet. The game is called *dörvölz* (or *migman*, which indicates it reached the Mongols from Tibet). The board is of grey or yellow cloth on which is drawn a grid of 17x17 lines. The six points c3, k3, c11, g15, o15, o7 are marked by black points and the six points g3, o3, o11, k15, c15, c7 by white points.

There are two kinds of pieces (of stone, glass or porcelain): (a) six black 'bulls' and six white; (b) 144 black 'dogs' (*gölög*) and 144 white, smaller than the bulls.

The game is in two phases. The first is a fixed initial arrangement known as a *tabia* (obviously the familiar Arabic term for the starting arrangements used in Muslim chess) in which the two players alternately put the black bulls on the black points and the white bulls on the white points. Popova now states (in French) that 'each player then in turn surrounds his

bulls with his own pieces. This arrangement divides the board into 12 zones of equipotential influence and greatly simplifies the game.'

Then she specifically adds that, in the second stage, the players alternately place their 'dogs' on vacant points, trying to form eyes. Once pieces are on the board they cannot be moved. The winner is the one who surrounds the greater number of empty points. This is said to be the only game of its type among the Mongols.

I am sure this is a misunderstanding by someone not familiar with go, and that the sentence "each player . . . with his own pieces" is misplaced. The lone diagram, incidentally, shows only the 12 initial stones as used in Tibetan go, in the same positions.

The only other thing I can add about Tibetan go is again due to Cheng. It is about the pieces. The famous 'cloud' stones from Baoshan in Yunnan province so esteemed in China were esteemed also by the Tibetan aristocracy and were so valuable that they were paid for in gold. The less well off used pieces of coloured glass, while the poorest people used black and white pebbles.

The 'cloud' stones (named after Yunnan — the province in the clouds and south of the 'cloudy' mountains — which lies southeast of Tibet) first appeared in the early days of the Qing era (1644–1911) and were made, by baking a special composition into a kind of marble, using trade secrets known only to the Xie family of Yunnan. It is said that only 20 sets a year were ever made.

Unfortunately the Xies' methods have not been handed down, and their secrets are lost in the clouds on the roof of the world — like so much of the fascinating history of go.

Notes

(1) The Crown Prince (1923–1982) became the king or *chogyal* in 1963 and was then known as the *Miwang Chogyal Chempo, Palden Thondup Namgyal*. He was deposed in 1975 when Sikkim was absorbed into India, and died in the United States.

(2) For Korean rules see *Igo Hyakka Jiten* (*Go Encyclopaedia and Dictionary*) by Hayashi Yutaka, Kin'ensha, Tokyo, 1965 (page 402) and the long discussion in *Chugoku Ko-kifu Sanpo* (*Browsing through Old Chinese Go Records*) by Watanabe Hideo, Shinju-sha, Tokyo 1983.

(3) In Korea there exists a corner fragment of a celadon board dated to 12 AD which suggests that in old 19x19 boards (which it is believed to be because a star point is shown at the 4-4 point) only 17x17 lines were actually used. The board is shown in the booklet *Badug and Korean Badug Association*, Korea Badug Association, Seoul (undated but circa 1978; badug is Korean for go). What is remarkable about the board is that the outside line forms the physical edge, so that no stone could possibly be placed there.

A similar observation has been made of the 7-8th century Korean board of 19x19 lines in the Shosoin, Kyoto, (one of three) which is discussed in many books (the best discussion is perhaps in the book *Go* by Masukawa Koichi, Hosei Daigaku Shuppanyoku, Tokyo, 1987). This does have an extra edge, but the stones that appear to marry up with this board number only 300, suggesting to some that only 17x17 lines were actually used.

Recall also the oldest known representation of a go board with stones on in a famous Tang dynasty picture. The part depicting a lady playing go on a 17x17 board was shown on the cover of *Go World* 22, Autumn 1982 (but note that it is dated to the Tianbao era, 742-756 AD, of the Emperor Xuanzong in Chinese sources, e.g. *Zhongguo Weiqi Shihua* [*Tales from the History of Go in China*] by Zhu Mingyuan, Taipei, 1980). There is no extra edge to this board, either, but stones do appear to be placed on the very edge.

For a lot more on Korean boards, including a 15th century 15x15 board discovered in a sunken Korean ship, see the first chapter of Masukawa's book, in which connection I would point out too the reference in the *Laoqida*, a primer of Chinese used by Korean schools and merchants in the 15th century. In Section 251, cols. 3-4 of the version in *Grammatical Analysis of the Lao Ch'i-ta* by Svetlana Rimsky-Korsakoff Dyer (Canberra, 1983), go, chess and dice are mentioned in a long list of items in phrase-book style prefaced by the phrase, 'I'll take you to buy some miscellaneous goods. We will buy . . .' For go, the reference is to 'ten large go boards.' (My italics)

(4) The first was found in a tomb in Wangdu County, Hebei Province in 1952. It is illustrated in Watanabe (*op. cit.*) and Masukawa (*op. cit.*). The locus classicus for 17x17 boards is, of course, the *Yi Jing* [*The Canon of Accomplish-*

ments] by Handan Chun of the Wei era (220-265 AD). The relevant passage runs: 'The go board has 17 lines both vertically and horizontally, making altogether 289 points. Of white and black stones there are 150 each.' The other much quoted reference is to the phrase 'three hundred go stones' in the *Bo Yi Lun* [*Discourses on Playing Go*] by Wei Yao of the Wu dynasty, 222-280 AD. (The full text can be found, for instance, in *Zhongguo Weiqi*, Vol. I by Liu Shancheng, Sichuan, 1985, pages 132-133). Until the discovery of the Han board in 1952 these passages long confused scholars.

(5) But for the Tibetan games see, for example, R.C. Bell, *Discovering Old Board Games*, Shire Publications, Aylesbury (1973), pages 37-39, and his *Games to Play*, Michael Joseph, London (1988), page 42, or Rin-chen Lha-mo's *We Tibetans*, Seeley Service, London (1926), pages 143-145, and also Hummel and Brewster below.

(6) Alignment games were known in ancient China, for example, the classic example being the progenitor of gomoku/renju, wuziqi (5 stones), and the original form of the Japanese version of the Crown Prince and the Servants type of game (where many weak pieces try to blockade one powerful piece), 16 Soldiers, was known at least in Heian times, having come from China.

(7) Jen Nai-ch'iang: "Die Fandse, ein Beitrag zur Volkskunde von Kham" [The Fandse — a contribution to the folklore of Kham], *Folklore Studies*, Vol. 5, Peiping (1946), pages 166-170.

(8) Siegbert Hummel & Paul G. Brewster: 'Games of the Tibetans', *FF Communications*, Vol. LXXVII No. 187, Academia Scientiarum Fennica, Helsinki (1963), pages 1-33, (In the photograph on page 5 some, but not all, of the 'bull' stones appear to be larger).

(9) These six syllables, derived from Sanskrit, are also used on Tibetan dice, and there refer respectively to the following regions: that of the gods, the Titans, mankind, the animals, ghosts, and hell. But the literal meaning is said to be something like: 'Hail! Jewel King [= the Lama] of the World.'

(10) I have not been able to find this cor-

roborated in English versions of Tibetan history. The most scholarly version I know is *China and Tibet in the Early XVIIIth Century*, by L. Petech, Monographies du T'oung Pao, Vol. 1, E.G. Brill, Leiden (1972), pages 8ff. While this account does not rule out the anecdotal version, it makes it sound highly unlikely — although apparently there was a huge gathering of priests from both sides. I imagine it falls into the category of stories like Sir Francis Drake supposedly finishing his game of bowls before sailing out to crush the Spanish Armada.


(11) Presumably the *Sa-Kar-Dawa*. See *The Land of the Lamas*, by David Macdonald, Seeley Service, Londong (1929).

(12) Assia Popova: 'Analyse formelle et classification des jeux de calculs mongols' [Formal analysis and classification of Mongol games of calculation], *Etudes Mongoles*, Vol. 5, Nanterre (1974), pages 7-60 (reference to go is on pages 38-39 and page 45).

There are, of course, other texts for go in Tibet. An important one is *Chugoku no Go* [Go in China] by Yasunaga Hajime, Jiji Tsushinsha, Tokyo (1977), principally pages 33-52. Yasunaga makes the point that go reached Tibet from China. On the wider subject of old go in general, the major discursive work at present is perhaps Watanabe Yoshimichi's *Kodai Igo no Sekai* [The World of Ancient Go], San'ichi Shobo, Tokyo (1977), for which see also the critique by Zhu op. cit., pages 206-214.

One-Move Problem

One move, and only one, will enables Black to save over half of his stones. Can you find the move?



Answer on page 68.

GO World Back Issues

Take Your Pick from Over 3000 Pages of Great GO Materials

GO World is a wonderful reference and instructional library for the serious GO player. It's always fresh and as valuable as the day it was printed. If you haven't already built up a complete collection of back issues, take this opportunity now! Limited quantities of most issues remain in stock (we're out of nos.1- 6). They're just \$6 apiece. Buy 4 or more issues and get nos. 7-24 for \$5 apiece or nos. 25 on for just \$4 each. S/H: \$1.50 (\$3 in Canada), FREE with purchase of 4 or more issues. This offer is good only in North America.

Some highlights:

- #25, 26, 34, 38, 43, 46- articles about Michael Redmond's Pro career
- #27-29- GO in China
- #30- The Driftwood GO Board
- #33- Quadruple KO
- #42- GO in the classics
- #47- Origin of GO in Japan
- #48- World of GO by Nakayama
- #49- Fuseki theory
- #50- 10-year anniversary issue

Of course, every issue includes a good selection of commented pro tournament games.

Send your check or money order in US funds to:

Ishi Press International
1400 N. Shoreline Blvd, Bldg A7
Mt. View, CA 94043


Mastercard and VISA orders are welcome. If you prefer, phone us at (415)964-7294.

Kobayashi Koichi: Modern Master

Kobayashi Koichi's recent triumphs amply demonstrate that he is worthy of recognition as a modern master of the game. 'Master', of course, is one way of translating the name of the title that is covered in this article. In the process of wresting this title from Kato in 1988 and defending it in 1989, not to mention his successive triumphs over the Chinese Meijin (Mingren in Chinese), Kobayashi has shown that he has achieved mastery of the varied tactical and psychological techniques that go into the making of a tournament champion.

Kobayashi is not ranked among the great stylists of the game, such as, for example, Otake and Fujisawa Shuko among contemporary players, but he has one thing in common with the great mid-century master, Go Seigen: a formidable ability to size up the overall position and to judge its requirements without being bound by theories or personal dogma. This is allied with an intuitive pragmatism, which enables him to find the most effective move for simplifying complicated positions in his favour.

A number of examples of this side of Kobayashi's talent can be found in the games that follow, but here we would like to show one that shocked his fellow professionals.




Dia. 1: Rin Kaiho (white) v. Kobayashi

In the above game from the 45th Honinbo league, Kobayashi was playing black. When White ataried at 3, Kobayashi ignored him, letting him make a ponnuki. It's an ironclad rule not to give the opponent a ponnuki if you can avoid it. The professionals following the game

on the TV monitor in the Nihon Ki-in pressroom all let out startled exclamations when they saw Black 4. Needless to say, Rin was the most astonished. Kobayashi commented later that even if he extended at 5, he couldn't expect to accomplish anything in this area. Black 4 stops White from walling off the centre, starting with 'a', and Black 6 is a big move. Still, any other player, as Kato commented, would extend to 1 in the diagram below, then consider discarding the two stones. If next Black 'a', White makes good shape with 'b', so switching to 3 would make sense. Thanks to the sacrifice of the extra stone, Black has the aji of cutting at 'c'.

Kobayashi, of course, was well aware of all this. He followed Dia. 1 because he wanted to be certain of getting the large endgame point of 6.



Dia. 2

It is this extreme pragmatism that marks Kobayashi off from other players, and it has to be given some of the credit for his lengthening tenure at the top. That makes him a difficult model for amateurs to follow: there are no rules for when you can break the rules.

13th Meijin Tournament Prize Money

(where different, 14th Meijin amounts are given in parentheses).

Winner: ¥22,000,000 (¥23,000,000)

Loser of title match: ¥4,500,000 (¥4,600,000)

Match fee — title-holder: ¥6,500,000
challenger: ¥4,300,000

Meijin league game fees — winner: ¥730,000; loser: ¥430,000.

13th Meijin Title: Kobayashi Overcomes the Kato Jinx

Above all else, Kobayashi probably remembers 1988 as the year that he finally overcame the Kato jinx. Kato was one of two players Kobayashi had always done badly against (see box). The other was Cho Chikun, but Kobayashi had taken care of this nemesis when he took the Meijin title from him in 1985, then the Kisei title at the beginning of 1986. After winning the latter, Kobayashi held three titles, since he had also won the Tengen at the end of 1985, but then Kato took the Meijin title away from him in the autumn of 1986. Moreover, Kobayashi was unable to win even one game of the title match. Somehow the strong points of his game just made no impression on Kato.

That changed dramatically in 1988, and in fact Kato was the main, though unwilling, contributor to making 1988 one of the most successful years of Kobayashi's career. Kato saw his Kisei challenge rebuffed, his Gosei title usurped, and now he had been stripped of his Meijin title as well. Kato was handicapped by the fact that he was in the depths of a horrendous slump, and Kobayashi didn't give him any help in getting out of it. For that matter, Kato still hasn't recovered his old form, though somehow he has clung on to his Oza title. At any rate, going into the Meijin title match Kobayashi held an 8-1 lead over Kato in their games played from January to August, which improved to 12-2 after this match (Kato recovered to win two games at the end of the year).

Kobayashi became the challenger to Kato by winning a Meijin-league play-off with Rin Kaiho, who had tied with him for first place on 6-2. Rin had lost to Kobayashi and Cho Chikun in the league, whereas Kobayashi had lost to Fujisawa Shuko and Ohira. This was the league in which Fujisawa Shuko aroused nostalgic memories in go fans by scoring 5-3, including a win over Cho Chikun as well (the league chart was given in GW53).

When the title match began, Kato seemed to have shaken off his bad form, for he started with a masterly victory in the first game. That gave him nine wins in a row in Meijin title matches (four in a row against Kobayashi in

Kato v. Kobayashi

Before this match started, Kato held a lead over Kobayashi in their total encounters, starting in 1973, of 36 wins to 27 losses. Actually, at the end of 1987, before the tide turned in Kobayashi's favour, his lead was 35 to 19, which meant that he had won close to two thirds of their games, a very high proportion between two top-class players.

Kato has also won four of their five title matches before 1988. Kobayashi's only success was in the 22nd Judan title, when he fought back from two games down in the best-of-five match. Actually Kobayashi had also won a Kisei playoff, which is close to being on a par with a title match. Below is a listing of all title matches between the two to date.

- 1981: 7th Tengen title: Kato won 3-2.
- 1984: 22nd Judan title: Kobayashi won 3-2.
- 1985: 33rd Oza title: Kato won 3-0.
10th Kisei playoff: Kobayashi won 2-1.
- 1986: 11th Meijin title: Kato won 4-0.
- 1987: 25th Judan title: Kato won 3-1.
- 1988: 12th Kisei title: Kobayashi won 4-1.
13th Gosei title: Kobayashi won 3-0.
13th Meijin title: Kobayashi won 4-1.




By coming out on the losing side of three title matches, Kato played the major role in making 1988 a great year for Kobayashi. Though he has won 32 titles, which puts him third in the all-time rankings, Kato has been in a bad slump for the last two years. In 1988 he had a minus record, 23 wins to 24 losses, for the first time in his career; he did even worse in 1989, scoring 22-25. In contrast, his record in 1987 was a more 'usual' 36-11.

1986 and another four in a row against Rin in 1987), which equalled a record for the Meijin title set by Cho Chikun.

The turning point was the second game, in which Kato missed a move that would have won the climactic semeai (capturing race) in what had been another masterly game for him.

Retrospectively, this slip can be seen as changing the flow of the series, but actually even in the third game Kato was doing well. At this point Kobayashi played a brilliant move, White 148, that some commentators claimed would rank among the great moves of go history. It is shown in the diagram below.



Just why this move is so good requires some explanation, which we will provide in our commentary on the third game. It didn't win the game in itself, but it turned a bad position into an even one and gave Kobayashi a chance.

All the games were very difficult and complicated and most of them could have gone either way if the luck had been different. Perhaps the point that aroused most interest about the series was Kato's return to the sanren-sei fuseki, which he played three times with black and once with white. In his 20s Kato was one of the leading exponents of the sanren-sei, but there's been a lot of development in the theory of this pattern since then. As Kobayashi commented, Kato's sanren-sei is different in nature from that of the main sanren-sei exponent recently, Takemiya, so these games should be of interest to fuseki students.

Game One: Kato the 'Killer'

White: Kobayashi Koichi Kisei

Black: Kato Masao Meijin

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 8 hours each.

Played in Tokyo on 7, 8 September 1988.

Figure 1 (1-51). A complicated opening fight to start the series.

Black 11. Kato plays this move five times in this series and each time Kobayashi plays the

low move of 12. Both of these players are obstinate and don't easily yield in their convictions, so it's not surprising that the same patterns occur again and again.





Figure 1 (1-51)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

White 12. If the high move instead, Black will be able to play the forcing sequence in *Dia. 1* later.

White 14. This is the right timing for the invasion. If White encloses the top left corner instead, Black will play 15, White 16, Black 49, making it difficult for White to reduce the moyo. If *Dia. 1* is one of the drawbacks of the high move, this sequence is one of the drawbacks of the low move.


Another possibility for 14 is a sanren-sei at 'a', but that would let Black make an impressive moyo with 'b'.

Black 17. Black 1 in *Dia. 2* used to be the standard continuation, but White jumps out into the centre one step ahead of Black, so recently Black 17 has become more popular. In reply, White doesn't want to jump to 1 in *Dia. 3*, as that gives Black a good attacking move at 2. Since this is Black's sphere of influence, seeking sabaki (settling a group) by attaching at 18 is correct.


Black 19 is a natural counterattack. Block-

ing on the inside at 1 in *Dia. 4* would make it too easy for White to settle his group.


Black 21. If at 1 in *Dia. 5*, then the sequence to 14 will follow. White settles his group, so this seems a little slack for Black.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

The continuation to 27 seems reasonable, but Kobayashi has a clever tesuji prepared. By sacrificing 28, he is able to link up his group to his group on the left with 32 and 34. If White simply played 28 at 30, Black would descend at 28, and White wouldn't get his connection.




Dia. 6


Black 35. Kato regretted not pushing up at 1 in *Dia. 6*. Black won't continue with Black 'a' through White 'd', as that would weaken the black stones to the left, but White 2 alone doesn't hurt them too much. The reason for making this exchange is —

Dia. 7. Blocking on top (the marked stone)

now becomes gote. If Black switches elsewhere, White can play 1 to 5, but if he next captures two stones, Black recaptures one stone and is way ahead in the semeai (capturing race). The best White could do would be to play 7 and 9, but even so Black can now tenuki. In contrast —



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 8. If White blocks (the marked stone) when the 1—2 exchange in *Dia. 7* hasn't been played, Black can't tenuki, as he gets into a bad ko up to 9. The conclusion is that White won't block at 'a' in *Dia. 6*, so Black gains the option of pushing through at 'a' later (when his group to the left is safe).

White 46 is sente, so White has clearly made a gain here.

White 46 was the first move played after lunch on the first day. By this time the framework of the game had been decided, with Kato having taken profit in three corners and Kobayashi pinning his hopes on his influence spreading out from the left side. Although he started out with the sanren-sei, Black has imperceptibly shifted to territory, which is certainly a contrast to the Takemiya sanren-sei.





Ishida Yoshio, the referee, reads out the sealed move (White 70).





Figure 2 (52-100)




Dia. 11


Figure 2 (52-100). Another difficult fight

Black 59 is an effective move. With 61 Black takes territory in his fourth corner. He gets the chance because White plays 60, the most aggressive answer to 59. If instead White attaches at 1 in *Dia. 9*, Black will be able to stabilize his group with 2 and 4. White 1 in *Dia. 10* might seem to give Black less help, but Black can still make shape with 2. If White attacks at 3, Black plays 4, then sacrifices his group to the right. (Black has been ready to give up these stones since playing 55 in the figure.)

Neither of these variations would be bad for White, but he prefers to attack with 60. In response, Black could follow *Dia. 11*. After 2 to 6, Black will have a tough time working out how to fix up his shape in the centre. Kato thought hard for 112 minutes, then decided to



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

go for his fourth corner.

Black 63 is the key move for securing sabaki.

White 70 (the sealed move). You'd expect White to attack the black group at the centre bottom, but it's very difficult to find the vital point. Takemiya advocated attacking at 76; the other possibility is White 'a'.

White still gets his chance to attack at 76, as Black answers 70 at 71. Black should secure the other group by jumping to 'a', then play 71 if and when White jumps out from 70.

White 76 is a good move. Black 77 doesn't fix up his shape, but it's the only move he has. After 85, Black is more or less sure of linking up to the right, but White has gained by building a wall in the centre.

White 88. White 92 would also be big, but Black would play 'b', forcing White 95, then invade at 'c'.






Figure 3 (101-130)



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

Figure 3 (101-130). Kobayashi's slip

Black 1 initiates a decisive fight: the game looks like being decided by the fate of the white stone here. White has taken so much territory with his left-side moyo that Black will


lose if he lets White live easily here.

White 4. Kobayashi spent 64 minutes on this, but it was dubious. When Black blocks off the side with 5, White is too cramped. Instead of 4 —


Dia. 12. White should extend at 1. If Black plays 2, he lives on a larger scale with 3. Therefore —

Dia. 13. Black must block at 2, but simply pushing through with 3 and 5 puts him on the spot. Fighting spirit calls for sealing White in with 6 and 8, but Black can't fight the ko after 9. Consequently, instead of 6 —

Dia. 14. Black will parry the attack with 4. However, he can't hope to catch White after 5 to 11.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Dia. 15. An alternative for White is to attack at 1. If Black 'a', White plays 'b', then moves out with an atari at 2, so connecting at 2 is the only move. White can then switch to the corner, living with 3 to 7. This is not as good as the previous diagram, but it would also give White the lead.


After 18 Black can get a ko with Black 'a' through White 'd'. Actually Kato was planning to try to kill the group by engineering a double attack on it and the white group on the left side.

Kobayashi: 'The idea of extending at 14 [instead of 4] just didn't occur to me. I thought that I could fight a ko as I had a lot of adjacent ko threats.'


Black follows up with a severe blow at 19. This is the vital point for attacking the group at the top, but Black's aim is not to kill it. He has two objectives: one is to use his attack to threaten the white group on the right side; the other is to chase the white group at the top out into the centre and in so doing to reduce White's moyo

Black achieves the first objective when he blocks at 21. Without 21 on the board, the white group on the right side is alive. If Black makes a placement at 1 in Dia. 16, White can

counter with 2 to 6 in sente, so he can make a second eye with 8 and 10. If next Black 'a', White 'b' ensures two eyes.



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Dia. 17. With the marked stone on the board, Black can answer 1 by dropping back at 2; White 'a' is no longer sente, so the group is dead. If White 'b', Black connects at 'c'; if White 'd' to 'f' follow, Black simply cuts at 'g'.

Painful though it is, White has to add a stone at 30. His poor play with 4 has been very costly.





Figure 4 (131-167)
67: below 54

Figure 4 (131-167). The coup de grace


The peep of Black 31 is very severe: White can't make two eyes at the top, so he has to flee with 32, but that sets up an excellent move for Black at 33. White is on the spot; if he hanes at 44, Black hanes at 65, which White can't answer at 56, as the group at the top will die after Black 'a'.

Black 43 is aggressive. The players following the game expected Kato to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 18*, but Kobayashi commented after the game: 'I would probably lose this way, but the difference doesn't feel like as much as two

points. If Kato had followed this variation, I intended to play to the end.'



Dia. 18




Dia. 19

12: captures (at 2)

White 46. White can't fight with 1 in *Dia. 19*, as Black has the tesuji of 2. A furikawari (trade) follows, but it is bad for White.

White 56 represents White's final attempt at resistance, but he is handicapped in this fight by the presence of Black 47 at the vital point. If instead White answered submissively at 1 in *Dia. 20*, Black would play 2, forcing White to live with 3, then reduce the centre with 4. This would give him a comfortable win.




Dia. 20

The continuation from 57 was forced; both sides knew that 67 was coming, so this was Kobayashi's way of setting the scene for resignation.


The only remaining problem is what happens to the black group in the bottom centre once White builds a wall in the middle. If he could capture the whole group, White would still have a chance, but actually when Black played 25 in Figure 3, giving White the sente

move at 26, Kato checked that he didn't have to worry about this group.



Dia. 21

Dia. 21. The best way for White to attack the group below is to try to strengthen his centre wall in sente, starting with 1 and 3. If Black 4 and 6, White will be able to stage an upset. White 7 is sente, so next White destroys the eye shape of the group below with 9. The continuation to 19 is probable, and the game would be close on the board. Note that if 6 at 8, White ataris at 6, then makes a placement at 'a' in the corner, leading to a ko. However, Black 4 here is not correct. Instead —



Dia. 22

Dia. 22. Black 1 here is best. White must play 2, so Black captures with 3; after 4, the continuation to 14 is forced. Black still loses his group, but in return he captures two stones, while Black 'a' will be sente, so he gains about ten points on the right here compared to Dia. 21. This way Black would win by about ten points on the board.

It's surprising that this trade could lead to a result that's still fairly close, considering the size of the groups involved, but what is really impressive is not just the fact that Kato read it all out and calculated the score when he played 67 but also that Kobayashi read it out



too and resigned. The professional skill displayed by both these players was awesome.

Before the series began, most observers had predicted a close territorial contest with only small-scale fighting, but instead we saw a comeback by 'Kato the killer'. It was a spectacular way to begin the match.

Incidentally, with this win Kato equalled a record set by Cho for the Meijin title of nine successive wins in title matches. He seemed to have come out of his slump at just the right time.

White resigns after Black 167.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 35 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 57 minutes.

(Adapted from the Asahi Shimbun.)

Game Two:

A Masterpiece Ruined by One Move

White: Kato Masao

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played at Yunogo hot spring (near Okayama City) on 20, 21 September 1988.

Commentary by Tozawa Akinobu 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-50)


Figure 1 (1-50). Not afraid of thickness

The first interesting point is White 14, which leads to a new variation. Usually White ataris at 1 in *Dia. 1* before extending. After 5, blocking at 'a' will not be worth much for White. In contrast, if Black answers in the same way after 14, that is, at 1 in *Dia. 2*, then blocking at 'a' later will be a big move. If Black


ignores it —



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


Dia. 3. White can play the 1-3 combination. Black can't play 'a' because of White 'b'.

These diagrams explain why White was reluctant to make the atari and why Black chose to answer at 15.

Black 21 seems a little too close to White's thickness. I'd prefer to make a pincer at 'a'.

Black 35 aroused controversy. The suggestion was made that Black 'b' would have been the natural flow. The balance of power at the top is the focus of the game at this stage, but Kobayashi is fond of profit. White builds thickness with 36 and 42, but I suspect that Kobayashi is not afraid of thickness.

Black 43 shows the same lack of concern for the opponent's thickness. If he were worried about it, he'd play the high move at 'c'. White would then extend to 'd', leading to a completely different game.



Dia. 4

White 44 is worthy of note. A moment's thought would have sufficed to reject the conventional combination of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*. When Black splits up the left side with 2 and 4, White's thickness is rendered impotent. However, White 44 at 'e' would leave White without a good way of blocking off the centre after Black 45. The shoulder hit of 'f' would be overdoing things. White 44 is a resolute move, but it seems to be a good idea.

Black can't change horses in midstream, so he goes ahead with 45. The result is an extreme contrast between profit and thickness.





Figure 2 (51-100)
84: ko; 99: ko

Figure 2 (51-100). Hidden danger

White 76, 78. White has been aiming at this ko for some time. He has an ideal ko threat at 82.

The placement of White 88 is a telling blow. White prevents Black from linking up with 92 and 94, then links up himself with 96. It should be clear now why he played 76 and 78.

White 96 was the sealed move. Kobayashi had been playing quickly on the first day: he had probably read out the sequence to 95 in advance. When he saw 96, however, he slowed down: he had suddenly realized that there had been an oversight in his reading.



Dia. 5

Dia. 6

Figure 3 (101-115) Kato's brilliancy

White 8 was the move that Kobayashi had overlooked. He had expected White to answer Black 7 at either 1 or 3 in Dia. 5, both of which moves would let Black link up with 2 and 4 at the cost of just one stone.





Figure 3 (101-115)



Dia. 7

White 8 is a brilliant counter. Kato spent 106 minutes on 90 in Figure 2, so he probably worked it out then. It is no longer so easy for Black to link up. If, after exchanging Black 9 for White 10, Black ataris at 1 in Dia. 6, White will switch to 2, cutting off the larger part of his group.

That means that Black is forced to connect at 11, letting White pick up two stones in sente. At one stroke White takes the lead.

'I felt as if I'd lost ten points through being pushed around like this,' said Kobayashi. He added that if he had known 8 was coming, he probably wouldn't have been able to sleep a wink the night before.

To go back a bit, Black 7 is actually a tesuji, though Kato greets it with a brilliancy. If Black simply played 7 at 1 in Dia. 7, White would answer at 2. After Black connects at 5, White descends at 6, getting a very favourable ko.








Figure 4 (116-132)



Dia. 8

Figure 4 (116-132). Neither side lets up.

White has a lead, but the game will be decided by what happens in the centre. Kato lets fly with another good move: the contact play at 16. Bad shape though it is, Black has to answer at 17. If he pulled back at 1 in *Dia. 8*, White would continue with 2 and 4, and the game would be hopeless for Black.



Dia. 9

One can also feel Kobayashi's determination in 19. Black 29 would be more solid, but that is how you play when you're ahead. White would counter with 2 to 6 in *Dia. 9* and win easily. Black 19 sets up the forcing move of 23, thus offering some help to the centre group, and also aims at the possibility, distant though it seems just now, of counterattacking with a cut at A.

Kato matches Kobayashi in severity: White 32 starts a fierce fight.





Figure 5 (133-153)



Dia. 10

Figure 5 (133-153). Kill or be killed

With White 34 Kato reverts to the lethal style of his youth, when he was 'the killer'. White's aim is to exterminate the centre black group. After the game he did let slip the comment, however, that he should have compromised and played to win on endgame. The move he indicated is cutting at 38 instead of 36, that is, 1 in *Dia. 10*. The continuation is forced: White keeps sente in the trade, so he can switch to 17, for a clearly favourable result.

Because White pushed along at 36, a large-scale life-and-death struggle was unavoidable. Actually, this should also have been favourable for White.





Figure 6 (154-175)



Dia. 11

Figure 6 (154-175). Kato's fatal slip

The semeai (capturing race) looks good for White when he makes a surprising blunder. All he has to do to win it is to fill in a liberty on the outside (the first principle of fighting semeais) with 54 at 1 in *Dia. 11*. Black's throw-in at 16 is tricky, but White just ignores it, continuing to fill in outside liberties with 17 and 19. Even if Black attacks with 20 and 22, White takes the ko with 23 and ignores all ko threats to atari at 'a' and capture. The game would then be over. This is not such a difficult semeai, so it's strange that Kato went wrong. He dropped a game that observers agreed had been a masterpiece for him up to this point and let Kobayashi draw even.

White resigns after Black 175.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 19 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 25 minutes.

(Kido, November 1988)

Game Three Kobayashi's Exquisite Move

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Kato Masao

Played in Imaichi City, Tochigi Prefecture on 28, 29 September 1988.

Commentary by Takemiya Masaki.




Figure 1 (1-20)

Figure 1 (1-20). The stones are crying.


In this series Kato has been imitating my sanren-sei. Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, but still it's not a good feeling.

The fuseki of my game against Kobayashi in the Tengen tournament, played before this match started, is shown in *Dia. 1* (next page). I answered White 16 with 17. If you don't play this way, the stones at 11, 13, 9, and 15 don't come to life.

After that, in another game with Kobayashi, this time in the Oza tournament, I switched 17 to 'a'. This makes for a stronger relationship with the stones at 11 and 13; compared to 17 it has merits and drawbacks. It would be ideal if one could play between 17 and 'a', but...

Kato took up position with 17 in the figure, but this lets White enter at 18, ruining everything. The point about go is that you have to

make the most of the stones you've already played. For his part, Kato might have felt some trepidation about playing as in Dia. 1, but once you've played the stones to 15, you've got no choice but to play in the centre.




Dia. 1

When White plays 18, you have to feel sorry for Black: his stones at 11, 13, 9, and 15 are crying.

As for Kobayashi, his White 20 is strange. Surely he should attach at 1 in Dia. 2. The other day Ishida Akira said to me: 'I imagine that after Black 4 in Dia. 2 you would play 5 to 9.' He's quite right. After 9, Black would probably have to add a stone at 'a', so White could attack the two black stones on the left with a move around 'b'.



Incidentally, this pattern appeared in the final game of the series.




Dia. 2

Figure 2 (21-69). A manly challenge


Setting the white stone in motion with 22 and 24 doesn't feel very good.


Figure 2 (21-69)
34: connects


Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Black 31 shows that Kato was perhaps infatuated with good shape. Black 31 and 33 are certainly a tesuji, but answering straightforwardly as in Dia. 3 is good enough, I think.

There is a frightening alternative to Black 35. Instead he could connect at 1 in Dia. 4. This looks risky because of all the holes in Black's position, but White is short of liberties. After 6, Black can capture at 7; if then 8, which is often a tesuji in this kind of position, Black wins the fight after 9 and 11.

Kobayashi: 'Of course, I had read this out. Instead of 8, White plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 5. Black gets a ko with 8 and 10, but White can play 11 and 13 in exchange for the ko. I think this would be a close game.'

Black 47 is a tesuji creating forcing moves

at 49 and 51 and also at A for later. White shows the same attention to detail, forcing with 52 and 54.

Black 57 is a manly challenge. Playing this way feels good and I heartily approve of it.





Figure 3 (70-100)



Dia. 6

Figure 3 (70-100). An opportunity goes begging.

Black 77. Living in gote by pulling back at 78 would not be interesting.

White 86. Correct is White A.

Black 87 and 89 are heavy and let White recover with 90 on. More severe would be 87 at 1 in Dia. 6. The continuation to 17 would give Black an overwhelming lead.

Figure 4 (101-148). Kobayashi's exquisite move

Black 9. Discarding the centre five stones is a calm decision. If Black fled with 1 in Dia. 7, White would counter with 2 to 8 and probably

pick up the four black stones to the left.

The question therefore arises of whether White should have played 8 before attaching at 2. In that case, Black would probably escape with 25, then answer White 2 by blocking on the inside at 24.





Figure 4 (101-148)



Dia. 7

Black 15 has to be one line lower, at 41. Of course, playing 15 is natural if you believe that White can't do anything in the corner.

Black 41. Black A seems to be better [as Kobayashi pointed out after the game].

[According to the Asahi commentary on the game, just after Kobayashi played 42 there was an earthquake, measuring 3 on the Japanese scale (severe enough to rock a building but not to do any damage). The game recorder confessed that he had felt tempted to flee, but he stuck at this post. At dinner, shortly afterwards, someone commented on the earthquake to the players. Kobayashi: 'Eh? When?' Kato: 'I didn't realize. Maybe it was because I beating a tattoo with my leg anyway.' The concentration of these two is impressive.]

White 48 is a very clever move.






Figure 5 (149–200)
64: ko; 81: ko (at 61)



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Figure 5 (149–200). *Kobayashi makes the game close.*

When Black blocks at 49, White can play 50 and 52, forcing Black 53. These two stones give White's corner group added resiliency, enabling him to get a ko.

If Black descends at 1 in *Dia. 8* instead of 49, White will link up to the left with 2 and 4. If Black omits 5 and White saves this stone, Black will later have to take the three white stones in the corner off the board, which would cost him a lot of points. White 'a' will also be sente later. This way Black would lose the game by a couple of points.


Black 1 in *Dia. 9* is even worse: White has a very sharp counter in the form of 2 and 4. Up

to 10 Black is cut off and reduced to one eye, so the game ends abruptly.

White 48 in Figure 4 gave Kato more of a shock than the earthquake before dinner. He confessed that when he played 49 he expected to lose. [Kobayashi discovered 48 when he was thinking about 30 in Figure 4.]

Black 53. If at 83, White plays a ko with 58.


White 54. Kobayashi: 'I thought that while I had the chance I might as well be greedy, but this was bad. It reduced the value of 48.' White 54 causes Black to lose three points. If the reader understands why, then he is of professional strength.



Dia. 10

Black 55 is the vital point for both sides: it is where 54 should have been played. The ko in *Dia. 10* would follow; to win it, White has to play 'a' and 'b'. In the sequence to 83 in the figure, Black gets to capture at 61 and 83, which gains him three points.

Black can't win the ko, so he switches to 67. However, he gives White back a point by omitting to hane at 72 first.



Dia. 11

Figure 6 (201–284). *Decided in the endgame*

Black 13 is a good move, but Black 15 turns the game into a loss. Good style here is to cut at 1 in *Dia. 11*. The best White can do is to atari at 2, so Black 3 to White 8 will follow. This represents a gain of two points over the Figure, so Black would probably scrape by with a half-point win. Kato realized he'd slipped up as soon as he let go of 15, but it was too late to do anything but curse himself.

This second mistake by Black (after missing the chance to hane at 72 in Figure 5) cancels out Kobayashi's mistake with 54 (Figure 5). At this point White seems to be half a point

ahead, but Kato slips up further in the subsequent endgame.




Figure 6 (201-284)

21: connects (above 17); ko (around 44): 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 64, 67, 70; 75: ko (right of 72); 76: connects (right of 44); 77: connects (at 72)

Even after Kobayashi's brilliancy with 48 in Figure 4, Kato had plenty of chances to win, but this move has to be given much of the credit for Kobayashi's eventual triumph, for it transformed an uphill fight into an even struggle; just as important was the psychological blow it dealt Kato.

There were mistakes, but this was a great fighting game. The clash between Kobayashi and Kato was certainly providing fans with exciting go.

White wins by 2 1/2 points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 37 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes.

(Kido, December 1988)

Game Four: Outreading Kato

White: Kato Masao

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played in Tokyo on 12, 13 October 1988.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi.

Figure 1 (1-26). Attack and defence

This was an exciting game, just as complicated and difficult as the others in the series.

Even with white Kato plays the sanren-sei. Compared to the high move at A, Black 9 has drawbacks and advantages. Because of my

style, the low move seems to suit my disposition. In the old days Go Seigen also often played the low move.

Black 15. I believe that the low move is superior to Black B.





Figure 1 (1-26)



Dia. 1

The fighting started with White 16. For my answer I considered only Black 17 and blocking at C. In the case of the latter, White will force with White D, Black 17. The answer I chose, at 17, urges White to set his stone in motion with 18 on.

Dia. 1. I didn't consider extending at 1. This gives White the option of living in the corner and makes a reducing move at 6 work well.


Black 21. I had a hard time choosing between this move and the clamp at 1 in Dia. 2 (next page). After the sequence to 14, blocking at 'a' will later be a big move for White.

White 22. If White connects at 1 in Dia. 3, Black gouges out his base with 2 and 4; White can't hope to link up with the marked stone above on the right side.

Naturally Black can't expect White to be so accommodating and sure enough Kato comes up with a good counter at 22. If Black answers submissively at 1 in Dia. 4, White will fix up


his shape with 2 to 6; if Black now makes a splitting attack at 'a', White gets plenty of eye shape with 'b', which is sente, and 'c'. Note that White can get an eye in gote by crawling into the corner.

For the above reasons, the exchange with 23 and 25 is natural.




Dia. 2

Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

White 26 is the follow-up to 22. Black won't want to play 1 in *Dia. 5*, as White builds thickness. If Black 'a' after 8, White plays 'b' and the black stone can't move.

Figure 2 (26-47). Exchanging right for left

Since the descent (Black 28) doesn't work well, connecting at 27 is the only move. The continuation is inevitable. If White plays 30 at 31, Black ataris at 36, then at A, and White's stones look heavy. He would have only one eye.

White discards all his scattered stones on the right and takes the left side in a furikawari (trade). Broadly speaking, the exchange looks reasonably even to me.





Figure 2 (26-47)



Dia. 6

Black 33 is essential in answer to White 32. If Black gives in to greed, pressing at 1 in *Dia. 6*, he will be hit with the contact play of 4 at the head of his stones. After White 10, Black 'a' is unreasonable because of White 'b'; if instead Black ataris at 'b', White gets a bigger moyo than Black.

From this point the game gets really difficult.


White 34 is the shape move, but it leaves Black with the strong counterattack of 39 and 41, so a kosumi at 40 would be more solid. But in that case Black would enclose territory with B, leading to quite a different game.

Black 39 and 41 apparently took Kato by surprise. He spent 45 minutes on 40.


White has no choice but to atari on top at 42. I believed that taking a firm grip on the white stone with 45 was about right. The corner is open, so Black can't expect to get a big territory by extending with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 7*. (Note that the forcing move of 4 creates a ladder if Black cuts at 'a'.)

Black 47. If Black cuts at 1 in *Dia. 8*, he picks up about 20 points, but White switches

to C in the figure, which is bigger. That's why I chose to invade at 47, which was the sealed move.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8





Figure 3 (47-73)

Figure 3 (47-73). Eliminating bad aji


The approach move at 66 instead of 47 would not be interesting: White 47, Black A, White 52. That's why Black chooses 47, but what if White counters with 66, that is, 1 in Dia. 9? I was thinking of attaching at 2. White 3 is the vital point, but Black should be able to settle himself after 4 and 6. If White 5 at 'a', Black ataris at 5, followed by Black 'b', White 'c', Black 6.

White plays 48 and 50 out of concern for the aji of the marked black stone. Once he does this, Black puts into effect the forcing sequence that he has had ready.

Black 63 is necessary to stop White from playing 68 at 69. Capturing with 70 and 72 is big, but Black is satisfied with 73. White could have considered keeping this capture in reserve.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10




Figure 4 (74-100)

Figure 4 (74-100). Building thickness while attacking

Black 77 is the last large move. Discarding the two stones with White 79 will now give Black a clear lead. In view of this, the question arises of whether White could have exchanged 90 for 91 before Black makes the cut. The problem is of course whether or not White 90 would have been sente.

White can't give up the stones, but even so White played 78 very quickly — he spent virtually no time on the move. I started to worry.

'Has Kato read it all out? Have I made a mistake?'

The continuation in this figure is just about inevitable. If White plays 88 at 1 in *Dia. 10* (previous page), Black resists with 2 and 4, then escapes with 6 and 8. White 7 at 'a' is impossible because of Black 'b'. If Black plays 2 at 'a', White captures with 'c', making good shape.

White saves his group, but Black builds thickness with 93 and harasses the white group to the right.





Figure 5 (101-131)



Dia. 11

Figure 5 (101-131). The last fight


White lived on the side, but thrusting through at 1 made Black thick, so I was satisfied with the way the game had developed.

However, the issue is still undecided. Everything hinges on the fight at the top. It's a difficult fight, with a lot of variations, but Black can't afford to give an inch. Once a game has progressed this far, it comes within the bounds of human intellect. If one's analysis is inferior, defeat will instantly follow.

White capped at 8. At this point I believed that swallowing up two stones with a kosumi


at 24 would lead to defeat. A difference of just a few points here will affect the outcome. I resolutely attached at 9, ready to fight.

White 10. If at 4 in *Dia. 11*, a very difficult fight follows after Black 'a' and White 'b'. If White starts with the contact play at 1, Black safely handles it with 2 and 4; if White 5, Black plays 6 to 10, after which White has no good continuation. If next White 'c', Black plays 'd'; if White 'e' instead, Black 'f'.




Dia. 12

Black 13 and 15 are important moves. If Black plays 13 at 1 in *Dia. 12*, White ropes off territory with 2, and the game looks bad for Black. He can't win unless he secures his territory with the hane plus extension of 9 and 15 in the figure.




Dia. 13

The sequence to 21 was what both Kato and I had read out. Next, making the ordinary push at 1 in *Dia. 13*, then starting the endgame with a wedge in at 'a', will give Black a win by nine points on the board. Playing this way couldn't be more unimaginative, so Kato peeped at 22, then cut at 24. I had seen this coming.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

I was quite happy to extend at 25. Or rather, I believed it was the only way I could win. If Black 1 in Dia. 14, White forces with 2 and 4, and Black loses. Dia. 15 would be closer. I can't tell which side would be ahead.

However, there were already signs of erratic play by Kato in this figure. He played unnecessary moves at 16, 28, and 30, wasting ko threats.





Figure 6 (132-149)



Dia. 16

Figure 6 (132-149). Missing the ko

White 32 and Black 33 lead to the crucial juncture. White blocks at 34, but this move doesn't work: White is unconditionally cap-

tured. In short, White 34 and Black 35 unnecessarily fill in dame points. Instead, White could have got a ko with 1 in Dia. 16.

In the sequence I read out during the game, I hypothesized the exchange of White 'a' for Black 'b' before 11, but this is very bad. White still gets a ko by simply playing at 11, so if he won this ko, he would be able to push up at 'b', which would be terrible for Black.

Well, the question is what happens in the ko fight. I don't really know — I can only say that it's very delicate. The problem for White is that he has already used several of his ko threats.

Could it be that from the outset Kato didn't plan to fight a ko? But if White blocks at 34, he has no follow-up whatsoever. He does his best to make it into a semeai, but in the end it's unreasonable.



Figure 7 (150-179)
76: connects (at 71)

Figure 7 (150-179). Saved by Kato's bad form

I feel that not only in this game but also throughout the series I was saved by Kato's bad form. That doesn't lessen my happiness and pride in winning, of course.

White resigns after Black 179.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 43 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 9 minutes.

(Kido, December 1988)



Game Five: Meijin Again

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Kato Masao

Played in Ito City, Shizuoka Prefecture, on 19, 20 October 1988.

Commentary by Kobayashi.





Figure 1 (1-30)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1-30). Taken aback by the peep

Except for the second game, Kato played the sanren-sei in every game. This I found a little surprising. Kato's sanren-sei has a slightly different feel to it from Takemiya's.

White 14, 16. I believe that answering low like this is correct. There are both advantages and disadvantages compared to the high answer on the 4th line, but all in all I think the

pluses are greater in the case of the low move.

Up to 16, the opening is the same as in the third game. In that game Black played A and White played B. Switching Black A to B would be the Takemiya style.

This time Kato invaded at 17. Making this kind of invasion at an early stage of the game is his forte. Knowing it to be his forte, I had to read out all the continuations carefully, so I thought for nearly an hour on my next move.

Up to 26 White gets solid outside influence. Instead of 27, securely capturing White 6 with 1 in *Dia. 1* also looks reasonable. After this, invading at White 'a' would be virtually out of the question. I suppose White would continue with 2 and 4, but he doesn't really get a big side territory, as the bottom left corner remains open.

Kato underestimated the effectiveness of the peep at 30. In fact, he seems to have overlooked it altogether. When I played it, he sank into deep thought, spending one hour 43 minutes before and after the lunch break on his next move. For my part, it was because of the threat of this peep that I had played as I did at the top. At the least, I thought, I wouldn't get an unfavourable result.






Figure 2 (31-47)

Figure 2 (31-47). Taking the lead

Black has no choice about 31, but I wonder about 33. As Kato himself commented after the game, he should have built thickness with 1 in *Dia. 2*. White will seek life on the edge, then the players will take up position with 15 and 16. Black would then switch to A in the figure. This result looks reasonable.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Because he played aggressively with 33, Black had no choice but to move out with the crude moves of 35 and 37. White 38 and 40 feel good because White is splitting open a tight black position.

Black 41, letting White block at 44, is very dubious. It's probably the losing move. Black must play 1 in *Dia. 3*. If White 'a' after 5, Black answers at 'b' and his corner is safe. The difference of one line is crucial. Actually, White might play 4 at 5, but Black still gets a better result than in the game. Black had no choice but to follow this diagram.



Dia. 4

Figure 3 (48–71). A very effective cut

Cutting inside at 48 is a superb tesuji. I was convinced that thanks to it I couldn't get a bad result locally. Instead —

Dia. 4. White 1 is the wrong point: Black will challenge White to a ko. Even if White hacks his way through with 5 and 7 as compensation for the ko, Black will skip lightly to 8. There are three white stones inside Black's corner, so this is an inferior result for White. He has clearly fallen behind.

When White plays 50, he is aiming at A. Black 55 is necessary, so White slides to 56 and gets a comfortable position. [If White omits 55, White will reduce him to one eye, beginning with A; if Black extends to the edge, White ataris at 55. This is not a threat, however, until White protects the cutting point at 54.]




Figure 3 (48–71)

White's task now is to hold on firmly to this advantage and in good time reduce Black's moyo. This he does a step at a time, with 64 on; this is the steadiest strategy.



Dia. 5
9: ko

Figure 4 (72–100). White's lead not affected by an attack of nerves.

White 76 is a slack move or perhaps I was over-anxious about playing safe. I was aware that challenging Black to a ko with A would have placed a heavier burden on him than on

White, but 76 was big territorially, so impulsively I played the safe move.




Figure 4 (72-100)

Dia. 5 (previous page). There was nothing to fear in playing 1 in the centre. If Black 2, White could start the ko with 3 and 5. When Black plays the ko threat of 10, White could end the ko with 11; Black's corner can be killed, which is a significant factor. Black can't afford to fight the ko.

Even with this slack move, however, my lead was not affected, as 76 was a big move in itself. The reader may get the impression that from this point I wrapped up an easy win, but actually there were a number of frightening moments.

White 98 was the sealed move.




Figure 5 (101-152)




Figure 6 (153-206)

Figures 5 & 6. Revenge for Kobayashi

I couldn't relax right to the end, because Kato was playing dangerous moves seeking an upset. It was not until the latter part of the endgame that I was sure of victory. Apparently the game would have been a jigo on the board if it had been played out.

Black resigns after White 206.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 20 minutes.

Black: 5 hours 30 minutes.

(Kido, December 1988.)

With this victory Kobayashi joined the select group of players who have made a comeback in a big title after losing it. In fact, only seven people have done it to date, the most recent being Cho in the 1989 Honinbo title. The triumph must have been all the sweeter for coming at the expense of the player who took the Meijin title away from him. By besting Kato, Kobayashi took a big step towards establishing himself as a modern master.



14th Meijin Title Match: Kobayashi Outboxes Awaji

Although he had three challenges for open titles behind him, Awaji Shuzo was an unexpected challenger for the Meijin title last year. No disrespect is intended towards Awaji in saying this; the reason is that he started out badly in the Meijin league and was one or two points behind the leaders till the later rounds. In other words, he had to wait for the higher-placed players to knock each other out, while he waited to walk away with the spoils. Most accommodating in this respect was Takemiya, who had blazed a path of glory through the first five rounds, only to lose his last three games. If he had won his final game, he, not Awaji, would have qualified for the playoff in which Awaji earned the right to challenge by defeating Rin Kaiho. (The league chart is given on page 6 of GW56.)

Awaji is an unusual figure amongst the current top-class players. Unlike the players who have won the majority of the open titles in the 80s (61 out of 70), he is not a Kitani disciple, so he didn't benefit from the hothouse atmosphere of that school, with all its live-in disciples. Awaji was apprenticed to Ito Tomoe 7-dan, a top woman player. The great majority of go players finish their schooling with high school, but Awaji is a graduate of Aoyama Gakuin, a top private university. The most unusual aspect of his career, however, is that he did not emerge as a top player until his 30s, which may have been the typical pattern in the past but which hasn't been in the last couple of decades. Awaji was a relatively anonymous player during his 20s, not making his name widely known until he challenged for the Honinbo title in 1983. He suffered an honorable defeat to Rin 1-4, but his unbridled aggression made the match an exciting one (see GW38, especially the extraordinary first game, the highlight of which was a massive semeai).

In person, Awaji is more like a successful businessman than a studious go player. He is articulate and confident and not afraid to express his own opinions, which makes him an entertaining commentator on TV games. His go is also entertaining, as he hates passive play and is always seeking to go on the offensive. Kobayashi commented after one of their games



Awaji Shuzo

Born on 13 August 1949 in Tokyo. Became shodan in 1968, 9-dan in 1984. Won the Prime Minister's Cup in 1977 and 1981 (this was a tournament for Tokyo players from 5-dan to 7-dan), and the New Stars TV tournament in 1978 and 1980. Awaji came into prominence when he challenged for three open titles within the space of a year: the 8th Gosei in 1983 (he lost 2-3 to Otake: see GW34), the 9th Tengen title in the same year (he lost 1-3 to Kataoka: see GW35, 36), and the 39th Honinbo title in 1984 (he lost 1-4 to Rin: see GW38). Losing all three matches must have been distressing for Awaji, but becoming challenger is in itself quite an accomplishment, while very few players ever succeed in winning a league.

Awaji was quite modest about his chances in this title match. 'Kobayashi is in a different class from me. Not only is he stronger, he's also perfected his own go strategy. However, if I exert 120% of my strength, I might land a lucky punch. . . . I haven't planned any special strategy for the match. If I can concentrate completely on the board, putting aside all extraneous matters, a path might open up for me. . . . If I had to give my strong point, it's that I can absorb punishment. Like in the movie 'Rocky'. The hero is hit so often his face is bent out of shape, but he keeps on coming back for more. Someone was kind enough to say that Rocky's image is similar to my go. If a furious melee breaks out, the opponent might make a slip and I might land a lucky punch. I'm going to pin my hopes on this.'



Awaji and Kobayashi do some sightseeing before the first game in London. This was the first Japanese title game to be played in the United Kingdom. Over 400 people attended the reception held the night before the game. When it was the players' turn to make their customary speeches, Awaji maintained his consistently low posture, saying: 'Kobayashi's main fault is that he has no chinks in his armour.' Kobayashi replied: 'Awaji's a hard puncher, so I'm going to be on my guard.' The game attracted a lot of press coverage, with The Times commissioning an artist (Jonathan Chetwynd, who's a 1-kyu go player) to do paintings of the players.

that he was as tired as if he'd played two games.

Despite all these admirable qualities, Awaji was clearly the underdog in the match against Kobayashi, but he did his best to make this an asset, seeking to disarm the champion with modest disclaimers that he was no real threat to his title (see the caption under his photo for an example).

In our account of the title match, the reader will notice the prevalence of boxing metaphors. It's not clear if these originated with the challenger or with go journalists, but at any rate Awaji enthusiastically identified himself with Rocky, specifically with his against-the-odds fightback in the first movie of the Hollywood series. The reader can judge for himself how apt the comparison is.

Game One: Never Say Die

The first game followed what had been predicted would be Awaji's winning pattern: a fightback and an upset in what looked like a lost game. To see how he did it, Murakami Akira interviewed Kato Masao Oza for *Igo Club*.

White: Awaji Shuzo 9-dan

Black: Kobayashi Koichi Kisei

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 8 hours each.

Played in London on 14, 15 September 1989.





Figure 1 (1-38)

Figure 1 (1-38). Awaji stumbles at the start

Murakami Akira: White 6 is unusual. What's the meaning of it?


Kato Masao: White usually plays the 1-3 joseki in *Dia. 1*, but presumably Awaji disliked the possibility of Black's continuing with 4 to 12. [Otake doesn't mind, however: he let Kobayashi play this sequence in the first game of the 1990 Kisei title match.]



Dia. 1

MA: I heard that White 20 and 22 were bad.

Kato: White continues with 20 and 22 after he's already answered solidly at 6. Perhaps he should have played 20 at 1 in *Dia. 2*. If Black 2, he makes a pincer at 3 . . . This would give a more open game.



Dia. 2

MA: Should Black play 2 in *Dia. 2* immediately?

Kato: He could also try a pincer at 'a', but knowing that White is aiming at 'b' would make him uneasy.

MA: Awaji was quoted as saying that up to 23 he lost the equivalent of the komi.

Kato: Black should be very satisfied: he's

built a thick shape in sente up to 21 and he's also enclosed his corner with 23.

MA: Is White 26 the way to play here?

Kato: Perhaps White thinks that White A won't be enough, so already he's resorting to emergency measures.

MA: Black 27 is solid.

Kato: White 28 also shows that White is trying to take extra profit to make up for his loss on the left side. Playing at 32 would be the usual move.




Figure 2 (39-80)

Figure 2 (39-80). *Striking deep inside*

Kato: I have my doubts about Black 39. Having been to all the trouble of building a wall, I'd want to expand with 1 in *Dia. 3*.

MA: Couldn't White just jump in?

Kato: I don't think so. The best he can do is to reduce the moyo from the outside.

MA: In that case, White would also enclose the top, would he?

Kato: Even if he tries to, about all he can do is to play at 'a', which is nothing special. Don't forget that laying waste to moyos is Kobayashi's forte.

MA: When White attaches at 40, Black's answer with 41 and 43 seems too solid. I can't help feeling this is slack.

Kato: Right, right. I'd prefer to pincer at 1 in *Dia. 4*.


MA: If White ataries with 2 and 4?

Kato: This will not be an easy fight for White after 7.


MA: Playing the knight's move of 48 lets Black cut with 49 and 51. Would playing 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5* instead be no good?

Kato: When Black peeps at 4, sooner or


later White will have to connect at 'a', so the atari at 1 becomes a bad move.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

MA: The moves from 52 on, 'pushing the cart from behind', look bad.

Kato: They are the only moves White has. However, it would be better to keep the exchange of 70 for 71 in reserve.

Figure 3 (81-110). *Awaji style*

MA: Black seems to have a fantastic game when he attacks with 81 and 83.

Kato: It's not that great for him. Capturing at 84 instead of 81 would be more solid, but the presence of the 70-71 exchange (the marked stones) makes Black decide to attack. Because after 84 to 90 he can capture at 91.

MA: If Black hasn't played the marked stone, he can't play 85 and 87.

Kato: In that case, Black would probably play 81 at 84. It would be a completely different game.






Figure 3 (81-110)
102: captures three stones; 105: recaptures



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Kato: Trying to live as in *Dia. 8* would not be appropriate in this game.

MA: Black's thickness would disappear.

Kato: White 108 is Awaji style.

MA: In what way?

Kato: There's a risk it will achieve nothing, but White is aiming at A.


MA: It's a very subtle point.

Kato: Instead of 94, White would like to throw in a cut at 1 in *Dia. 6*, but he will be captured after 2 to 6.

MA: Would using 101 to link up his three stones be bad?

Kato: White would play 2 and 4 in *Dia. 7*, after which he could peep at 'a'. If Black adds a stone at 'a', then White would probably live in sente.

MA: With 103 Black sets out to make territory in the centre.



Dia. 8



The referee, Ishida Yoshio, reads out the sealed move (White 74).





Figure 4 (111-165)
ko: 42, 45, 48, 51, 54; 65: connects



Dia. 9

Figure 4 (111-165). The ko leads to an upset.

MA: White cuts at 12, hoping for a chance to lay waste to the centre. Apparently Kobayashi commented after the game that instead of 27 he should have made good aji with 1 in Dia. 9, then set out to capture the centre group.

Kato: If he's going to try, this is the only way to do it.

MA: Has he got a chance?

Kato: How would I know? [laughter] At any rate, the group would be in danger after 2 to 9.

MA: But if there's no way to say if Black could capture the group, that means that it's no longer clear who has the lead.

Kato: I'd like to ask Kobayashi how he as-


sessed the territorial balance at this stage.

MA: White starts the ko with 38.


Kato: Initially Kobayashi probably thought that White couldn't afford to start this ko. After all, it would be terrible for White if he lost it.

MA: But White has picked up extra ko threats in the centre fight.

Kato: Wait a moment. Isn't Black 35 a bad move? How about simply playing 1 in Dia. 10? If White starts the ko as he does in the game, then after Black cuts at 21 he gets the atari of 'a', which will capture four stones. That makes a big difference.



Dia. 10
ko: 6, 9, 12, 15, 18



Dia. 11
ko: 6, 9, 12, 15, 18


MA: Because White 'b' is not sente.

Kato: That makes White 4 a point-losing ko

threat, so he can't play it. In that case, White will play the ko threats of 4, 10, and 16 in *Dia.* 11. But now Black can resist by descending at 19.

MA: Which means?

Kato: To continue, White will make the ko bigger with 1 in *Dia.* 12, after which he has no choice but to use the ko threat of 3. He gets one sente move here, but Black will answer 9 by ending the ko. After White 11, Black will capture the white group at the top with 12. The problem now is what happens to the status of the black group on the bottom left, but after 18 it won't die.



Dia. 12

5, 8: ko; 10: connects (right of 2);

11: takes two stones; 12: connects one stone

MA: Does that mean that the final losing move was 55?

Kato: When Black gives way with 55 and White captures at 56, the game is bad for Black.

Figure 5 (166–238). *Awaji* starts well.


Kato: Black 75 is a clever move.

MA: If White uses 76 to cut at 77?

Kato: Black attaches at A and breaks open this area. If there were to be any big change in the endgame, it would come if Black used 67 to play the sequence from 75 to 82 first, then made a diagonal move at 74. Probably it would still be a loss for Black.

MA: The game may be an upset win for White, but when you look at it, you find it's a very difficult game.

Kato: It's certainly true that Kobayashi was over-optimistic and played a bit too tightly. For example, the way he let White link up so easily up to 80 in Figure 2.



Game Two: No Quarter

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Awaji Shuzo

Played in Kyoto on 27, 28 September 1989.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho.





Figure 1 (1-24)




Dia. 1: what White wants

Figure 1 (1-24). A dubious new pattern

Kobayashi plays 10 because he knows that Black isn't going to make the usual extension along the bottom after 9. (Black's position would be too low if he played 11 at 'a'.) The high move of 10 works well with 12.


Kobayashi has played this pattern before (Dia. 1), in the 1988 Kisei title match with Kato (see GW53, page 39). To avoid giving Kobayashi the result he wants, Awaji omits 1 in the diagram, playing 13 immediately, even though this lets White take the vital point of 14.

If Black hanes at 17, he will have a hard fight on his hands when White cuts at 19, so Black has to jump to 15. In the game this move gives Black a surprisingly good result, but that is because Kobayashi misses the vital point with his next move.




Dia. 2: the vital point

White 16 should be at 1 in Dia. 2. If Black connects at 2, White can take up position with 3 and 5 (5 could also be at 'a'). Black will probably counter at 2 in Dia. 3, so that he can push along at 4, but still White can be satisfied with the result to 9. Instead of 9, White could also adopt a large-scale strategy with 9 in Dia. 4.



Dia. 3: more satisfactory




Dia. 4: on a grander scale

White 16 lets Black make a solid shape by wedging in at 17. In short, White has been too polite: Black presented him with one vital point at 14, so he has returned the courtesy with 17.

White 20 is a turning point. It gives Black an excellent ponnuki with 21 and 23, which seems painful for White. He should connect at 1 in Dia. 5. Black of course will attack with 2 and 4, but handling this kind of running fight is Kobayashi's forte.

Professionals following the game agreed that the ponnuki gave Black a favourable result. Kobayashi's fuseki was not up to his usual standards.



Dia. 5: avoiding the ponnuki




Figure 2 (25-44)

Figure 2 (25-44). *Awaji is over-aggressive.*


Black 29 was a move no one predicted. It was considered a bold move, typical of Awaji, but the player himself had second thoughts about it. Awaji: 'This was funny. If I'm going to play in the centre, it should be the knight's move at 32.' That was the opinion of other professionals too. If Black 32, Black could aim at the slow but steady attack of A later.

Kato Masao pointed out that the biggest move is 1 in *Dia. 6*. Rin agreed and gave the continuation to 9. If White 2, Black plays a two-step hane that increases his centre influence and helps his moyo on the top right.

Kobayashi responds to Awaji's challenge immediately with 30 and 32.

White 38 is an instructive move: it shows a nice feeling for balance.

White 40 and 42 are an example of Kobayashi's policy of settling the shape early. It's based on his judgement that there's no need to keep his options open if he can get an acceptable result.



Dia. 6: Kato's suggestion





Figure 3 (45-64)

Figure 3 (45-64). *Prolonged thought produces a dubious move.*

White 46. Kobayashi took a lot of trouble over this move (he spent 35 minutes on it, which is quite long for him). It succeeded in upsetting the rhythm of Awaji's play.

After pondering for one hour 59 minutes, Awaji made the shoulder hit at 47. This looked like a typical thrust of the sword from Awaji, but the result showed that it was actually an overplay. Rin wondered why he didn't answer patiently at 1 in *Dia. 7* (next page). Awaji presumably disliked giving White the forcing move of 2 (which is one reason why 46 was a good move), but Black could be content to answer submissively at 3, as he gets sente to

switch to 5. This result would be reasonable for Black. The point of White 2 is that it enables White to counter Black 1 in *Dia. 8* with 2 etc., but even so Black would still have the aji of a clamp at 'a'.



Dia. 7

Dia. 8

When Black continues with 49 and 51, White makes the strongest counters. Black feels compelled to pull back at 53, which means that his attack has fizzled out. Kobayashi has given us a convincing reminder that he excels at this kind of infighting.

White 54 and 56 are a good combination: they prevent Black from making a solid connection at 56 and they also exploit Black's shortage of liberties. Black can't play 57 at 61, as White will wedge in at 59 and capture him.

The result is that Black loses points at the bottom and sees White take the large point at the top he could have had. White has lightly discarded the three centre stones. Up to 64, he has scored a success.





Figure 3 (65-84)



Dia. 9: Black's chance

Figure 3 (65-84). An ideal opportunity

Black 65 was the sealed move. At this stage both players thought that White was ahead, but Rin disagreed. Despite Black's failure to achieve anything with his attack on the right side, Rin believed that his central thickness kept him in the game. Incidentally, note that Black loses nothing by forcing with 65 and 67, but capturing the white stone next with A will not be sente.

White 72. Kobayashi spent 27 minutes on this move, but the peep was his first and only dubious move of the game. Kobayashi: 'This was the worst possible timing. I should have played at 83 or B instead.'

This was Awaji's chance. Attacking with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 9* would be very big. If White 4 at 9, then Black would descend at 4 in sente, so Kobayashi intended to play 4 and 6. Even so, giving Black the sente capture up to 13 would be most painful. Black could then push along at 15, making the peep meaningless. This way it wouldn't be easy for White to win, according to Rin.

Ignoring the peep shows fighting spirit, but letting White cut at 76 is bad, as it makes Black thin in the centre. Black had to connect at 76 or play 15 in *Dia. 9*.

With 75, 81, and 85 in the next figure, Black again misses chances to follow *Dia. 9*.




Figure 5 (85-101)


Figure 5 (85-101). *The losing move*

Black 85, the last chance to follow Dia. 9, is the losing move. When White plays 86, he gains 15 points compared to Dia. 9. Black is now behind in both territory and thickness.

'Running along the side [1 in Dia. 9] is a completely ordinary move, but for some reason I didn't see it during the game,' said Awaji later, looking puzzled.

Black 93 and 95 are gote, but they aim at a placement two points above 88

After jeopardizing his game with the mistimed peep at 72, Kobayashi was playing very slowly and carefully. After 31 minutes' thought, he made the placement at 96.




Dia. 10: Kobayashi's profound analysis

Black counterattacks with 97, forestalling the white contact play at 99. We would like to ask the reader's indulgence and show two long diagrams that demonstrate how deeply Kobayashi reads. If Black had played 97 at 1 in Dia. 10, he planned to sacrifice his stones, squeezing on the outside with 8 to 18. Black

wins the fight by one move but White is satisfied. Moreover, Black is handicapped in the centre by the cutting point between 11 and 13. To give just one example —

Dia. 11. If White plays 1 and 3, then White 5 becomes sente. Black 6 above 4 will just help White, but if 6 here, White switches to 7, setting up a loose ladder after 11. Please confirm for yourself that Black can't escape.



Dia. 11: a loose ladder





Figure 6 (102-137)
ko: 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36

Figure 6 (102-137). *An easy ko for White*

White 2 is another move showing Kobayashi's flexibility and sureness of judgement. If White plays 2 at the 3-3 point, Black will make a placement to the left of 14, creating complications.

Black 3. If at 1 in Dia. 12 (next page), White will sacrifice the two stones with 2 to 8, then switch to A in the top left-hand corner of the figure. That is why Awaji counters with 7.

Black continues to resist desperately with 13. White has to play 14 to forestall Black B, so Black gets a ko with 17. However, White has plenty of local ko threats. The question is how many ko threats Black can get at the centre top.



Dia. 12: sacrifice




Figure 7 (138-182)
ko: 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 76, 79, 82


Figure 7 (138-182). Kobayashi wraps it up.

Black 47. If omitted, White captures some stones with White 47, Black A, White B.

The aim of Black 59 is to make the later cut with 67 and 69 severer, but White adroitly seizes the opportunity to turn the tables on his attacker with 60 to 64. If White wins and connects the ko, Black's group will be the one in trouble.

White 70 wraps the game up. The aim of 69 was to create more ko threats, and Black probably expected White to answer at 1 in Dia. 13. Black could then play 2 and 4; if White 'a' next, Black squeezes with 'b' and 'c', cutting off the white group to the right; if instead White 'c' after 4, Black escapes with 'a' and can't be caught.

This last hope disappears when White plays 72 and 74.



Dia. 13: too good to be true

'I tried too hard here,' was Awaji's first comment after the game, pointing to the right side. As Rin pointed out, there was nothing to criticize in Awaji's play up to 29: there was no need to try for anything special on the right. Even so, Awaji still had chances later, after Kobayashi's sole slip with the peep at 72, but he missed every one of them.

For better and for worse, Awaji's individuality came out strongly in this game. 'I can't play pretty go and win in a pretty way,' he said, but for go fans, it is his fondness for fighting that makes him such an exciting player. It also made the series a memorable one, for it aroused a similar combativeness in Kobayashi. Throughout the series no quarter was asked and none was given.

Black resigns after White 182.

Time taken. White: 6 hours 39 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 54 minutes.


(Kido, December 1989 and the Asahi Shimbun.) (Meijin report translated by John Power.)

Since we have run out of space in this issue, we will give the remaining games of the 1989 Meijin title match in our next issue. Also in our next issue:

- Games 4 and 5 of the Ing Cup final between Nie Weiping and Cho Hun-hyun.
- The 1990 Kisei Title Match
- The first article in English on *tewari*, a standard technique for analysing the efficiency of stones. Tewari is a standard procedure in professional analysis, yet strangely little known to amateurs.
- Plus many other features.


Cho Chikun, Honinbo & Judan

In this issue we analyse a standard endgame technique, then look at two applications of it, one straightforward and one fairly advanced. The relationship between the problems presented below may be far from obvious now, but we hope our explanation will convince you.




Problem 23: Black to play

Blocking at 2 in answer to White's invasion emphasizes territory. What is the best continuation after White hanes at 3?



Problem 24: Black to play

White peeps at 1 before making the hane.
How should Black respond?




Problem 25: Black to play


If Black does nothing, White will play at 'a'. How can Black secure the biggest corner? It may take an imaginative leap to see it, but the answer involves an application of the same technique as in Problems 23 and 24.

Answers on page 53.


Eight Tesuji Problems




1. Black to play



2. Black to play




3. Black to play



4. Black to play

1. Black has a clever move to save his group.
2. Black can save his cut-off stones.


3. Black can save all his stones.
4. Black can save his group




5. Black to play

5. This is not the same as Problem 1. What's the best endgame sequence for Black?

6. Black can save his group.



6. Black to play




7. Black to play

7. Black can save his stones on both sides.

8. There's only one move that will secure life.


Answers on page 54.



8. Black to play


36 Tesuji Patterns

Sakata Eio, Hon. Honinbo




Pattern 22: Black to play

White is attempting to settle his group with a two-step hane. What is the best way for Black to answer?



Pattern 23: Black to play

White is using the same technique, but Black's marked stone is one line higher. What difference does this make?




Pattern 24: Black to play

White has just slid into the corner. Instead of following the usual joseki, Black should make use of his marked stone.

Answers on page 56.


36 Life and Death Patterns

Kato Masao, Oza




Pattern 22: White to play

The theme in this issue is *nakade* or 'big eye' problems. White can kill Black, but he has to be careful



Pattern 23: Black to play

By definition, *nakade* problems involve sacrifices to prevent the opponent from getting separate eyes. That should be enough of a hint.



Pattern 24: Black to play


When Black came in with the marked stone, White resisted with his marked stone. Let's kill him anyway.

Answers on page 57.

Good Style and Correct Shape: Answers

Answer to Problem 23

Dia. 1. Blocking at 1 is the ordinary move. Black cuts at 3, capturing a stone, and gets a reasonable result. The only problem is that White has scope to play White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' later, taking some endgame profit.




Dia. 1: ordinary

Dia. 2: the tesuji

Dia. 2. The other possibility is to make a hane at 1. White can intercept with 2, but the key is to crawl at 3. White 4 and Black 5 follow, giving Black more territory than in Dia. 1. The drawback is that the ponnuki gives White greater thickness. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 3. If White extends at 1, Black simply connects at 2. White must defend the cutting point at 'a', so Black extends at 'b' and captures the three stones.



Dia. 3: unreasonable

Dia. 1: slack


Answer to Problem 24

Dia. 1. Black 1 is slack. When White crawls at 2, Black has to block at 3, so there has been a big reduction in his territory. Playing Black 1 at 3 gives a similar result.

Dia. 2. As we hope the reader guessed, Black can apply the tesuji used in the previous problem. White can't extend at 5 after Black 3, so Black is able to block at 5. This is a big improvement on Dia. 1.

Dia. 3. There is another strong variation: connecting at 3. If 4, White can't resist Black's hane at 5. Black plays this way when he wants

to cut off and attack the three white stones on the left.




Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 3: counterattack

Answer to Problem 25

Dia. 1. Blocking at 1 has to be condemned as crude. After 3, White can make good shape with a hane at 'a'. Black has been very docile.




Dia. 1: docile

Dia. 2: the tesuji

Dia. 2. Black 1 is a clever tesuji. It looks risky, as White can extend at 'a', but Black is ready with a counter.

Dia. 3. Black's follow-up is to crawl at 2. If White 3, Black wedges in at 4: this is where he applies the pattern learnt from the previous two problems. After 6, White must defend his stone at 5, so Black captures the three white stones to the right. The conclusion is that White can't play 3. Therefore —




Dia. 3: unreasonable


Dia. 4: a big corner

Dia. 4. White must pull back at 1, so Black secures a big corner with 2. Not only that, he has also prevented White from making eye shape the way he did in Dia. 1. This result is a success for Black. Note that he could also play 2 at 'a'.

Dia. 5. This is another application of the tesuji. The best way to stop White from encroaching on Black's bottom area is to attach at 1. White will probably play 2, so Black pulls back at 3. Playing Black 1 at 'a' would lose a little.




Dia. 5: application



Dia. 6: unreasonable

Dia. 6. Countering with 2 is unreasonable, in view of the defects in White's shape in the corner. After 3 and 5, White will be forced to give up his three stones.



Dia. 7: inferior variation


Dia. 7. Black 1 is another tesuji, but this lets White reduce Black's area a little more than in Dia. 5. If White 2 at 3, then Black 2 is a good answer. This transposes to the sequence in Dia. 6.

(Kido, November 1986)

Eight Tesuji Problems: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 is a clever probe. If instead Black started with 'a' or 'b', he wouldn't get anywhere, as the reader should confirm for himself.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Dia. 2. White will probably connect at 2, but when Black plays 3 and 5, White can't atari at 'a'. He has to capture the stones on the outside with 4, so Black captures the two stones in the corner and lives.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the vital point. Even though this stone is not played in contact with the three white stones to the left, it is the only way of capturing them.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If White 2, the rest is easy. If White 2 at 3, Black cuts at 2 and captures all six stones.

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black's centre four stones have only three liberties, so he can't waste any time. Black 'a' would let White atari at 1, putting him ahead, so the only move left is 1.



Dia. 1


Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If White 2, keeping White down to two liberties with 3 is essential. Sacrificing the

stone is the way to win the fight.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. Attaching at 1 is the only move. If Black first exchanges 'a' for White 'b', then hanes at 1, White has a clever counter at 'c'.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If White intercepts with 2, then he is forced to let Black link up with 3 and 5. If White plays 2 at 4, Black hanes at 'a', getting a similar result.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the move. White can't resist because of his shortage of liberties. He has to capture at 2, so White links up with 3. If White plays 'a' next, he falls into a trap: Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd' (this is the *oi-otoshi tesuji*). The same tesuji is the reason why White can't start with 2 at 'a'. Playing a *furikawari* (exchange) would clearly be bad for White.



Dia. 1


Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black 1 is a mistake: Black hasn't read it out. This way he doesn't get an *oi-otoshi*.

Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. Black 'a' fails when White answers at 'b', whereas Black 1 exploits the shortage of liberties of the white stones on both sides.

Dia. 2. White 2 is the strongest answer, but Black cuts off three stones to the left when he cuts with 3. If White fills in a liberty with 2 at 'a', Black captures the other stones with 'b'.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Answer to Problem 7

Dia. 1. Black will have succeeded if he captures the pivotal stones, the marked white stones. Black 1 takes advantage of the opponent's shortage of liberties.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Dia. 2. White 2 is the only move, so Black uses the throw-in at 3 to set up an *oi-otoshi* capture. Note that if Black played 1 at 3, White would be able to connect his two stones. That's why 1 has to be played at the outset.

Answer to Problem 8

Dia. 1. First of all, Black sacrifices a stone by descending at 1. This is the only way of making two eyes. If White resists with 'a', Black attaches at 'b' and captures him.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2


Dia. 2. White is forced to play 2 and 4 (the order of these moves doesn't matter) to capture Black, but that gives the latter just enough time to make two eyes by forcing with 3 and 5.

(*Let's Go*, 1986)


36 Tesuji Patterns: Answers

Answer to Pattern 22

Dia. 1. Pushing down with 1 and 3 is best. Especially in a handicap game, it's advantageous for Black to settle the shape as soon as possible, to prevent White from getting up to tricks. Black has two cutting points in his shape, but this is nothing to worry about.




Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: continuation

Dia. 2. When White cuts at 4, simply turning at 5 is important. Next —

Dia. 3. If White 6, Black hanes at 7, securing this group. White now has little option but to save his corner stones by cutting at 10, but then Black strikes a blow at the vital point with 13. He has taken a firm grip on the game.




Dia. 3: Black in control




Dia. 4: too peaceful

Dia. 4. Black 1 gives White time to catch his breath and secure his group with 2. In contrast to Dia. 3, the shape is not settled, so the position remains an open one, which is to White's advantage.

Answer to Pattern 23



Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: White's option

Dia. 1. Black plays the same sequence to 5 as in the previous pattern. Particularly in handicap games, this is the best way for Black


to play. However, the higher position of Black's stone above gives White an extra option.

Dia. 2. Instead of cutting at 11, White can force his way through with 10 and 12. Up to 16 he builds centre influence, though at the cost of giving Black over 20 points of profit. Note that crawling at 15 is important. If omitted —

Dia. 3. White can block (the marked stone) in sente. If Black ignores it, White gets a two-stage ko in the corner.



Dia. 3: bad for Black




Dia. 4: good for Black


Dia. 4. In positions in which taking central influence is not interesting, White will cut at 4 and live in the corner. Black is satisfied, because this way his marked stone is working efficiently. Also, the threat of Black 'a' stops White from pushing along to the left of 6 and cutting.

Answer to Pattern 24

Dia. 1. The best way to make use of the marked stone is to push along with 1 and 3. Usually these are considered bad moves, as Black is 'pushing the cart from behind', that is, White keeps one step ahead of him and secures territory with each move he plays. However, White will immediately bang his head into the marked stone, so things are different.



Dia. 1: best




Dia. 2: joseki but —

Dia. 2. The hane of 1 is considered to be the joseki, but here it is inferior. When White pushes up at 2, the marked black stone loses just about all of its effectiveness.

Dia. 3. After Dia. 1 Black can wait for a

good opportunity to peep at 1. If White 2, blocking at 3 makes excellent thickness. Black can also look forward to a sente move at 'a'.



Dia. 3: follow-up Dia. 4: resistance futile

Dia. 4. Just for reference, for readers who are seeing the tesuji of 1 in Dia. 3 for the first time, White must not counterattack with 2. Black will be grateful for the chance to build a wall with 3 and 5. This is well worth sacrificing a stone.


(Let's Go, August 1983)

36 Life and Death Patterns: Answers

Answer to Pattern 22

Dia. 1. Finding White 1 is not so difficult. The problem is to discover White 3 when Black resists with 2. This sets up a ko; if White wins, he can connect and make the 'rabbit six' shape, which reduces Black to one eye (see page 26 of *Life and Death* by James Davies). Please confirm this for yourself.

If Black connects at 'a' with 2, Black plays 3 and gets the 'rabbit six' shape much more easily. If Black plays 2 at 3, White cuts at 'a'; even if Black captures the two white stones, White captures the two black stones on the edge with a snapback, so Black gets only one eye. If Black 2 at 'b', White ataris at 'a'.




Dia. 1: correct


Dia. 2: alive

Dia. 2. White 1 falls between two stools: it doesn't threaten the two black stones to the right and it doesn't make a nakade shape. Black lives with quite a lot of territory with 2. If Black plays 2 at 'a', White plays 2, and the result is not a 'rabbit six' but a seki.

Dia. 3. If White 1, Black lives with 2. If White plays 'a' next, all he gets is a seki. Black 2 at 'b' would let White get a 'rabbit six' with White 2.



Dia. 3: wrong




Dia. 4: wrong


Dia. 4. White 1 is the vital point, but answering Black 2 at 3 lets Black live with 4. There are two vital points in this shape — 1 and 4 — and White has to play both of them.

Answer to Pattern 23

Dia. 1. First Black extends at 1. If White answers at 5, Black kills him easily with Black 4; if instead White 3, Black plays 2 and White is dead. White 2 is the strongest answer. If next Black 5, White plays at 3 and gets a seki, but Black has the clever move of 3. If White 4, Black connects at 5; this looks as if White should be alive, as he captures four stones, but he is handicapped by his shortage of liberties. Next —




Dia. 1: best for both




Dia. 2: dead

Dia. 2. When Black ataris at 7, White can't play at 9, so Black is able to reduce him to one eye. Note that Black can reverse the order of 7 and 9.

Dia. 3. If White tries to expand his eye space with 2, Black plays 3. If White 4, Black makes a nakade shape with 5, killing White. If instead White plays 4 at 5, Black 4 reverts to the sequence in Dia. 1.



Dia. 3: dead



Dia. 4: failure

Dia. 4. Black 1 may be a vital point, but the timing is wrong. White can fight a ko after 2 to 6.

Continued on page 64.


How to Stop the Monkey Jump

Sato Masaharu 9-dan

Most go players can probably remember the shock they received the first time an opponent played the large monkey jump against them. It probably seemed absurd that the opponent could expect to get away with such a large jump inside your 'territory'. The real shock comes, however, when you try to block it the wrong way and the opponent just keeps on coming, reducing your formerly plump territory to skin and bones.


Learning the correct way to stop the monkey jump is the first step towards mastering endgame technique. In this article, we present the standard patterns that every go player should know to avoid slipping up with the monkey jump.

Pattern One



Black to play

White 1 is a large knight's move, known when it is played on the edge of the board as the monkey jump or *sarusuberi*. Black has four ways of stopping White from coming in further.




Dia. 1: wrong

Dia. 1. Dropping back to 1 is a mistake. White crawls along the edge at 2, causing Black to lose points. If next Black 'a', White keeps crawling with 'b'; if, however, Black blocks at 'b', he has to make sure first that White can't cut at 'a'.


Dia. 2. The diagonal contact play of 1 is the

standard way of stopping White from coming in further. If White backtracks with 2, Black continues with 3 to 7. This is gote for Black, but it is safe and steady. Please confirm for yourself that White can't play 2 at 3 or 4 at 7.

There are three other ways of blocking the monkey jump, all of which give the same result.




Dia. 2: the standard move



*Dia. 3: the placement
8: connects*

Dia. 3. The placement of 1 is a tesuji. White has to play 2 to link up, so Black can squeeze with 3 to 7. White captures a stone, but his territory is smaller, so the result is the same as in Dia. 2.




*Dia. 4: the peep
8: connects*

Dia. 4. Black can also start with the peep at 1. If Black 3 next, we get the same result as in Dia. 3 with a different order of moves.


Note that in both Dias. 3 and 4 White would not gain by playing 6 at 7. Black would atari at 9 and take sente.

Dia. 5. In this case, attaching at 1 is also correct. The result to 7 is the same as in *Dia. 2*. When you play this way, however, it is important to check first that White can't counter with 2 at 7.




Dia. 5: also possible

Pattern 2



Black to play


The position is a little different from Pattern One. When you consider the gap at 'a', there is only one move for Black.




*Dia. 1: correct
8: connects*

Dia. 1. When Black has to worry about the gap at 'a', the best policy is to start with the peep at 1. Black then uses the sacrifice of 3 to squeeze as before. Black 9 now becomes a good move, defending the cutting point at 'c' and plugging the gap at 'a'. Note that if White plays 2 at 7, he ends in gote, losing points, after Black 'b'; likewise if he plays 6 at 7 (this time Black plays 'c').

Dia. 2. The placement of Black 1 is a mistake. Black is expecting White to answer at 3, but instead he can counter with the 2-4 combination. Before he knows it, Black's four stones are lost. Please confirm for yourself that Black has no way of winning the semeai (capturing race).



Dia. 2: failure




Dia. 3: failure

Dia. 3. Black 1 is not appropriate in this position. Cutting at 4 puts Black on the spot. In Pattern One he would capture White with the counter of 5 and 7, but here he collapses after White 8 and 10.


That means that Black has to play 3 at 4, but clearly he loses points when White crawls at 3.

Pattern Three



Black to play

Stopping White is simple. We would like you to think of White's best continuation.




Dia. 1: sente for Black


Dia. 1. Black doesn't have to agonize. He rams into White with 1, making miai of blocking on both sides. If White 2, Black keeps sente with 3 and 5. However, White does not have to be so cooperative.

Dia. 2. Jumping to 2 is the standard answer. This forces Black to block at 3, whereupon

White switches elsewhere. If Black later captures at 'a', White plays 'b' and he still has a better result than if he hadn't played the marked stone, letting Black block at 'b'.




Dia. 2: best for both



Dia. 3: bad for Black


Dia. 3. The placement at 1 doesn't take sente. White will ignore 7, so Black loses the initiative. Black also gets about a point less in territory than in Dia. 2.



Dia. 4: ko

Dia. 4. Some strong players may have thought of playing the sequence from 1 to 5. If White connects at 3 after 5, Black ataris at 'a' in sente. However, Black must be prepared to fight a very big ko if White extends to 'a' instead. This tactic has to be considered an emergency measure for situations in which Black has a lot of ko threats.

Pattern Four




Black to play

The position may appear to be similar to the previous pattern, but the absence of a


black stone at 'a' makes a crucial difference.

Dia. 1. There is no way that Black can block White in sente, so the problem is to find the most profitable way of doing so in gote. Best is Black 1. If White 2, pulling back at 3 next is the key point of this pattern. In short, the sente move of 'a' next will become Black's privilege, so White won't be able to make territory at 'b'.




Dia. 1: correct

Note that if Black exchanges 'c' for White 'd' before playing 3, Black 'a' will no longer be sente.



Dia. 2: variation

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black still answers at 3. So long as White doesn't take gote to add a stone at 'a', exchanging 'a' for White 'b' will remain Black's privilege, so the result is the same as in Dia. 1.




Dia. 3: a loss

Dia. 3. Black 1 does stop White from coming in further, but note that after the continuation to 7, White gets a point at 'a'. A difference of one point is extremely important in the endgame.

The value of the monkey jump

To conclude this brief analysis of the monkey jump, let's take a look at how much it's worth as an endgame move. First —


Dia. 1. This is the standard result when White plays first.



Dia. 1: White plays first.

Dia. 2. If Black gets to play here first, he will block at 1. Answering 1 is gote, so at this stage of the endgame White is certain to switch elsewhere. That means that continuing with 3 and 5 is Black's privilege.

Comparing the two diagrams, Black has six more points in Dia. 2 and White has three less, giving a total value for the monkey jump in Dia. 1 of nine points in sente.



Dia. 2: Black plays first.

Since Black 1 in Dia. 2 is gote, this endgame position favours White. An endgame position in which only one side has a sente move is not as big as a position with a double-sente move. On the other hand, Black 1 is bigger than an ordinary gote move because it forestalls a sente move by the opponent (such moves are called 'reverse sente').


(Let's Go, November 1981)

Stopping the Monkey Jump

Haruyama Isamu 9-dan


Below are four problems to test your understanding of the article above. They are followed by a

slightly different problem, also involving the monkey jump.




1. Black to play

Problem 1. How should Black answer the marked stone?




2. Black to play

Problem 2. Black has to bear in mind his defect at 'a'.




3. Black to play

Problem 3. Black has to watch out for the marked white stone.



4. Black to play


Problem 4. Black has a troublesome hole in his position at 'a'. How should he play?




5. Black to play

Problem 5. The problem here is to find the best move for Black from amongst A, B, and C. You have to take into account White's counter. Is the monkey jump the best move?


Answers on page 62.




Dia. 1: correct



*Dia. 2: loses a point
10: connects*



Dia. 3: disaster




Dia. 4: another disaster

Dia. 4. Black 1 is also misguided: he is in bad trouble when White counters with 2. We can't say what the final result will be, as there is a ko, but note that right to the end the marked white stone will be a thorn in Black's side.

Answer to Problem 4


Dia. 1. The placement of 1 is the best move when Black has the hole in his position above. If White 2 and 4, Black squeezes up to 7, then defends at 9. White 6 at 7 would let Black take sente with 'a'. Instead of 4 —




*Dia. 1: solid
8: connects*

Dia. 2. White can switch to 1 here, as he did in Problem 2. Black counters in the same way with 2 to 6. White will now switch elsewhere, leaving 'a' for later if he gets a chance.


Dia. 3. The peep at 1 leads to exactly the same result. If White 4, the same sequence follows as in Dia. 2. If White 4 at 6, Black ataris at 'a', leading to the same result as in Dia. 1.



Dia. 2: variation



Dia. 3: also possible




Dia. 4: wrong

Dia. 4. Black must not attach at 1 when he has the hole at 'a'. White counters with 4, and after 6 'a' and 'b' are miai for him. That means Black would have to give way with 3 at 4, but this loses two points compared to the correct answer.


Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. The point of this problem is to find the best endgame move, which entails looking at the continuation. Best is Black 1. This may seem too restrained, but the truth is the opposite. White's best counter is 2, but that lets Black play 3 and 5 in sente.



Dia. 1: correct


Dia. 2. Force of habit might lead one to play the monkey jump, because it usually makes the biggest reduction, but here it is too greedy. White has a clever counter at 2. If Black 'a' after 6, Black can't connect his two stones when White ataris at 'b'.



Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 3. If the small knight move, White holds Black in check with the same tesuji. This result is not so bad, as Black does keep sente

with 3 and 5, but Black can't crawl at 'a' next, so White gets more territory than in Dia. 1. Note that Black 5 at 'a' would lead to the same result as in Dia. 2.



Dia. 3: inferior


The monkey jump has to be used with care: it gives the opponent most scope for a counterattack.

(*Let's Go*, November 1984)


36 Life and Death Patterns: Continued

Answer to Pattern 24

Dia. 1. The key to solving this problem is discovering the hane at 1. White's best answer is at 2. If instead he plays 3, White connects at 2 and kills him. White 4 is also best; if instead White captures at 'a', Black ataris at 4 and kills the group. White 4 makes it most difficult for Black. Next —



Dia. 1: best




Dia. 2: oi-otoshi


Dia. 2. White throws in at 6 to set up an oi-otoshi capture, but —

Dia. 3. Black surprises him by connecting at 9. After White captures with 10, he makes a placement (where the marked stone is). This kills White unconditionally. If Black connects at 10 instead of 9 —


Dia. 4. The best Black can do is to get a ko with 1 after White captures the four stones.



Dia. 3: dead



Dia. 4: ko



Dia. 5: wrong

Dia. 5. If Black plays 1 instead of 1 in Dia. 1, White counters with 2 and 4. If Black next captures a stone, White ataris at 'a' and Black can't connect to make a nakade shape, so White lives.

(*Let's Go*, August 1983)

The Tale of Genji: Japan's First Go Stamp

Mizuguchi Fujio

The painting depicted on the front cover is one of two showing scenes from the 11th-century classic The Tale of Genji reproduced on two postage stamps issued in Japan last year. Astonishing though it may seem for the country that has been the world leader in the game for the last four centuries, these are the first stamps featuring go to be issued in Japan. Mizuguchi Fujio, an employee of the Nihon Ki-in who played a role in having the stamps issued, tells the story behind them.

Paintings of two scenes from *The Tale of Genji* — 'Yadogiri' (see the cover of this issue) and 'Takegawa' — were selected for two stamps issued on 6 October 1989 to commemorate International Letter-writing Week. The two paintings were taken from the Tale of Genji Picture Scroll, which is designated a National Treasure.

According to one theory, the Tale of Genji Picture Scroll was painted by the 12th-century court painter Fujiwara Takayoshi. The picture scroll is a valuable document giving us a faithful picture of life at the imperial palace and among the aristocracy during the Heian period (794–1185) and of their dwellings.

In *The Tale of Genji* there are four descriptions of playing go, but only two of these scenes are included in the picture scroll. The one depicted on the ¥120 stamp [to be given on the cover of the next *Go World*], from the Takegawa chapter of the book, shows two sisters playing a best-of-three match, with the stake being the old cherry tree in the garden. Secretly watching them is Lieutenant Kurando. The ¥80 stamp shows a scene, given on the cover of this issue, of the Emperor playing the courtier Kaoru. In this scene also they are playing for a stake, this time a chrysanthemum blossom. (The other two scenes in the novel are in the Utsusemi and Tenarai chapters. It's interesting to note that except for the Yadogiri scene shown on the cover, all of them show women playing go. This reflects the prominent role played in cultural life by the women of the Heian aristocracy.)



The only other go stamp we know of, this Taiwanese stamp (issued in the early 1980's?) shows a game being played at the Han court.

(Collection of Tanaka Fumio)

Order Your Own Set of Japanese Stamps Commemorating Go

While our supplies last, get your own set of the Go stamps described in this article. We will send you both stamps in mint condition and mounted on a display card. Just send \$10 plus \$1 s/h to Ishi Press International, 1400 N. Shoreline Blvd., Bldg A7, Mountain View, CA 94043. US check, postal money order, or charge to your VISA or Mastercard only please.

1989 in Statistics

A look at the all-round statistics for last year will give a good idea of the players who were in form and doing well. For professionals, of course, the most important list is the first. This list only gives earnings from tournaments: earnings from teaching, royalties and magazine fees, public game commentaries and so on would have to be added to get the total income of a player.

Top Ten Prize Money Winners

1. Kobayashi Koichi: ¥86,880,000 (about \$550,000)
2. Cho Chikun: ¥59,650,000
3. Takemiya Masaki: ¥57,810,000
4. Rin Kaiho: ¥38,060,000
5. Otake Hideo: ¥31,110,000
6. Kato Masao: ¥25,290,000
7. Awaji Shuzo: ¥21,900,000
8. Yoda Norimoto: ¥17,130,000
9. Fujisawa Shuko: ¥14,350,000
10. O Rissei: ¥13,160,000

Kobayashi is getting close to the magic ¥100,000,000 mark, but he would need to win a fourth title to crack it.

Most Wins (7-dan and up)

1. Yoda Norimoto 7-dan: 51 wins, 15 losses
2. Komatsu Hideki 7-dan: 43-14
3. Rin Kaiho Tengen: 42-20
4. Hikosaka Naoto 8-dan: 41-18
5. Otake Hideo 9-dan, O Meien 8-dan: 39-15
7. Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan: 37-14
8. Ohira Shuzo 9-dan: 32-13
- Tei Meiko 7-dan: 32-16-1 jigo
- Takemiya Masaki: 32-21

Best Winning Percentage (7-dan and up, over 23 games)

1. Yoda: 77.3%
2. Komatsu Hideki: 75.4%
3. Yamashiro Hiroshi: 72.6%
4. Sugiuchi Masao 9-dan: 72.4% (21-8)
5. Otake, O Meien: 72.2%
7. Ohira: 71.1%
8. Hikosaka Naoto 8-dan: 69.5%
9. O Rissei 9-dan: 69.1% (29-13)
10. Sakai Takeshi 9-dan: 67.9% (19-9)

The results of some of the players conspicuously missing from the last two lists follow.

- Sakata Eio: 15-8 (65.2%)
Fujisawa Shuko: 25-16 (60.9%)
Ishida Yoshio: 26-19 (57.7%)
Kato Masao: 22-25 (46.8%)

Redmond Update

To conclude, we would like to look at what sort of year Michael Redmond had. For Michael, the year started badly when he lost to Jimmy Cha in the U.S. Fujitsu Qualifying Tournament, but after Jimmy stunned a couple of Japanese 9-dans and almost beat world champion Cho Hun-hyun, that loss didn't look so bad. (Jimmy Cha again beat Michael in the 1990 Qualifying, so Michael will have to wait to make his debut in the Fujitsu Cup.)

Michael's most significant achievement of the year was winning all eight of his games in the Oteai or promotion tournament. This earned him second place in the top section (5-to 8-dan) — he was beaten out of first place by Nakano 5-dan, who had a higher points total from his eight wins (see GW50 for an explanation of the points system in the rating tournament). This gives Michael a good start on his path to 7-dan, but so far he has only played nine of the minimum 20 games required, so he will have to put in at least another year. Actually he is sitting on a winning streak of 12 games in the Oteai.



Against 9-dans Michael did not have as much success as in the previous year, scoring only two wins in seven encounters. That makes his career total against 9-dans 10-17. Probably most painful were two losses to Otake. Of course, as Michael makes his way up the dan ladder, this statistic begins to lose much of its significance. It's not big news if a 6-dan beats a 9-dan.

More important is how well one does in

the newspaper and TV tournaments. Michael's best result has been in the 20th New Stars TV tournament, in which he reached the semi-final, which he lost to Yoda this year. In an earlier round he beat Yuki Satoshi 6-dan, one of the leading young players at the Kansai Ki-in. In the newspaper tournaments he did not do as well as in the previous year, when he reached the final sections of the Judan, Gosei, and Tengen tournaments. However, he did win his way into the main tournament of the 2nd IBM Cup (his game against Ishida Yoshio was given in GW56).

One new development in Michael's career is that this year he has been given the column in *Go Weekly* answering readers' questions. The drawing on page 66 identifies Michael's column.

Go World News

Continued from page 8

64) turns out to have been misleading, though she herself seemed to say as much in an article she wrote for *Igo Club*. She did leave Beijing to go home to Shanghai, but she is still appearing in tournaments — and playing better than ever, judging by the above result.

Qian Challenger for 4th Tianyuan Title

Qian Yuping 9-dan defeated Nie Weiping 9-dan in the playoff to decide the challenger to Liu Xiaoguang, holder of the Tianyuan title. The match will start in April.

Go Topics, Go Trivia

This column is a collection of go highlights and sidelights that didn't make it into our news section. Some of them are trivial, some are newsworthy, but we hope they will all be of some interest to the reader.


Too Late!

This story comes from the 7th round of last year's Meijin league, and it shows that timing is everything in go. Takemiya, who was in equal first place with Rin on 5-1, was playing black against Ishida Yoshio. If Takemiya won, he would have got a place in the playoff with Rin, whereas even if Ishida won, he already had no hope of retaining his place in the league.

The problem arose in the bottom right corner in *Dia. 1*. Takemiya made a sudden attack with his 95th move (the marked stone), taking away the eye shape of the white group. Before that, he had made a preliminary manoeuvre at the bottom to set up the atari at 5.

After thinking for four minutes, Takemiya pushed through at 1. When Ishida played 2, Takemiya muttered: 'Eh? Something's funny,' and scratched his head. After another ten minutes he extended at 3, muttering, 'I'm crazy. I must have been asleep.'

'It's too late to stop now,' said Ishida, pushing out at 4.




Dia. 1: too late!

The reason why Takemiya was so upset was that he had realized that the atari of 5 was now too late. It was too much to hope for that White would docilely capture the black stone. Instead he countered with 6 and 8, forcing Black to defend at 9 and letting him capture at 10. Not only did this open up a huge hole in Black's bottom position, it also made any further attack on the white group out of the question.

'My timing was bad. How careless! What a scatterbrain!' bewailed Takemiya. Ishida just sat composedly, fanning himself.

Takemiya accused himself of carelessness, but he hadn't played any of his moves hastily. Rather, the pitfall was perhaps the professional's dislike of playing a forcing move before it is necessary. In this case, he kept it in reserve for too long.



Dia. 2: the right timing

Before playing 1 in Dia. 1, Takemiya had to force with 1 in Dia. 2. At this stage White has no choice but to capture with 2. Then, when Black plays 3, White can no longer resist as in Dia. 1, so he will have to sacrifice a part of his group. After the sequence to 14, the game would be even, whereas in Dia. 1 it is a loss for Black.

This game was played immediately after Takemiya had lost the Honinbo title 0-4 to Cho and perhaps he still hadn't recovered from the shock.

Takemiya also lost in the last round of the league, this time to Kato. Since both Kato and Ishida were out of the running for the challengership, Takemiya was twice 'kicked by a dead horse', as the Japanese idiom puts it.

(*Let's Go*, November 1989)

A Story of Multiple Forfeits

The following story is a little old, but it is still worth telling. We missed it at the time, because, taking place as it did in the early rounds of a tournament, the Japanese go press made only passing reference to it. We have had to rely upon personal investigation to piece together the full story.

In the first round of the final section of the 14th Tengen tournament (played in spring 1988), a dispute arose in the game between Ishigure 9-dan and Rin Kaiho. Ishigure was in his last minute of byo-yomi, and the timekeeper read out 'ten', that is, the 60th second of the last minute, which meant, or should have meant, that Ishigure automatically lost on time. The rule is simple and explicit: if the timekeeper says 'ten', you've lost. However, Ishigure maintained that he had placed his stone on the board before the timekeeper said 'ten' (if true, the timekeeper was at fault

for not stopping his count). Normally Ishigure wouldn't have got anywhere with his objection and probably, after grouching a bit, he would have accepted the verdict, but the situation was complicated by a spectator, a veteran professional, who put his oar in supporting Ishigure's claim.

The dispute had to go to arbitration. The mills of the relevant Nihon Ki-in committee grind very slowly, and there was a delay of a couple of months. In the end the committee reached a compromise decision, declaring that the players should replay the game.


On the appointed day Ishigure turned up, but Rin showed his displeasure with the committee's judgement by not showing up. Ishigure of course won the game by forfeit, but Rin's wordless protest must have come as a shock to him. He in turn did not show up for his second-round game, forfeiting to Ogata 7-dan. One can imagine the bemused reaction of the sponsoring newspapers (the Tengen is sponsored by a partnership of three regional newspapers) to these successive forfeits; they probably had to stretch out commentaries on other games to fill the blanks in their go columns.

One final note: what happened with the game fees? The rule is that when a game has to be replayed (for example, because of a triple ko), the players receive no fee, though they are paid as usual for the replay. A player forfeiting a game also forfeits the game fee. Since the winner is not at fault, he is paid.

Intentional forfeits are very uncommon; it's safe to say that two in one tournament is a record.

One-Move Problem: Answer

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the move. If White 2, Black 3. Black 1 in *Dia. 2* is wrong, even though it does enable Black to live in the corner as in *Dia. 3*. Black 1 threatens Black 'a'.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Dia. 3

(*Let's Go*, December 1984)

Two New Books on Go

All About Thickness

by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

A completely new kind of go book from the Ishi Press.

Two-color printing makes the advanced concepts of thickness and influence graphically clear — and instantly understandable.

Most go books are top-heavy with text and endless explanatory diagrams. Ishida's approach in this book is the opposite — large diagrams, simple explanations, a minimum of mind-numbing text — yet this is the most successful attempt in the go literature to convey to go players of all levels the secrets of building thickness and making effective use of influence.

How do you build thickness? What areas

of the board should you aim to control? In which direction do stones exert their force? How close should you approach a strong enemy position? How many points can you expect to convert a thick position into? The answers to these and many other questions will be apparent at a glance when you read this book.

All About Thickness, the first book of its kind, was a best-seller in Japan. Go players around the world should find the English version just as enlightening as Japanese go fans.

Price in N. America, \$11.95, plus \$1.50 for s/h; all other countries, ¥1,900 (including shipping).

Graded Go Problems for Beginners, Volume Four

by Kano Yoshinori 9-dan

The final volume in Kano 9-dan's exhaustive treatment of elementary tactics, tesuji, and life-and-death problems is the most challenging of the series. It will be found equally useful by beginners who have worked through the first three volumes and by established players who want a systematic review of the problems that come up in actual play.

The four volumes in this series are the ideal books for players who have just learned the rules of Go, bridging the gap between a beginner's book and some of the more advanced elementary books. Combined they

contain 1,377 problems that thoroughly drill the reader in the fundamentals of the game. These problems will lay a solid foundation for progress by helping the beginner to master the elements of capturing and defending stones, life and death of groups, elementary tactics, the opening and the endgame.

If you are trying to teach beginners or trying to popularize go, these are the perfect books to use as a follow-up to an introductory text.

Price: in North America, \$11.95, plus \$1.50 for s/h; all other countries, ¥1,900 (including shipping).

Order from:

The Ishi Press, Inc.
CPO Box 2126
Tokyo, Japan

In North America order from:

Ishi Press International
1400 North Shoreline Blvd., Building A7
Mountain View, CA
USA 94043

Orders may be paid for by VISA or MASTERCARD. Please provide us with your card number and expiration date.

